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[Abstract] This report offers an in-dept analysis of the role of international election obser-
vation missions in during the political upheavals in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. It presents the work 
of three leading, young academics from Kyrgyzstan. The report forms part of the ‘NUPI 
Network for Election Observation and Exchange’. This is project that is supported by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The starting point for the assessments presented 
here is the realisation that international election observer missions played a central part in 
the events that eventually lead to the toppling of President Askar Akaev’s administration 
in march 2005. Kyrgyzstan is also a case that highlights the immense challenges that face 
election observation missions in non consolidated democracies of the former Soviet Union. 
Many of these countries, Kyrgyzstan included, have developed traditions of deep-seated 
and sophisticated manipulation of election procedures. Given these preconditions, the three 
articles aim to assess from differing perspectives how election observation was conducted in 
the country in 2005. 
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NUPI Network for Election 
Observation and Exchange 
The present volume is the first publication produced within the project NUPI 
Network for Election Observation and Exchange. This initiative, funded by 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has both a research and a 
practical component. The research part seeks to facilitate research on 
election observation and democratic developments in Moldova, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. A key aim is to enable and facilitate research by scholars 
from the region.  
Increasingly, international election observers are playing a prominent role 
in political developments in the former Soviet states. Some election 
observation missions have been criticised for being too influenced by 
Western ideas and for unjustly propagating Western standards and practices 
in the new countries of the East. A core idea behind the project is that 
election observation should not create a top–down relationship between 
Western and non-Western countries, but that all countries should have the 
chance to participate in the international community and be involved in 
efforts to strengthen democratic and human rights norms.  
Key project outcomes from the first phase include:  
 27 observers from Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
monitored the Norwegian parliamentary elections on 12 September 
2005. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC), with the support 
of NUPI, organised this mission. A report detailing findings and 
suggesting improvements has been submitted by NHC to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development.  
 24 observers from Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
monitored the local elections in Kyrgyzstan on 18 December 2005. 
Their report, with findings and suggestions for improvements, has 
been submitted to the Central Committee for Elections and 
Referenda.  
 WebPages with election observation resources and news have been 
launched, http://www.cac-elections.net. 
 Networking among election experts, researchers and civil society 
has been enhanced in the sphere of election observation in the 
region.  
 Two NUPI reports comprising nine articles by scholars from the 
region are being published – one of which is the present volume. 
The other report offers in-depth analyses of key aspects of the legal 
and political framework for election observation in Azerbaijan.  
 A seminar has been conducted at the OSCE Academy Bishkek: 
‘Role, Effect and Status of Election Observation in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus’.  
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 Introduction 
Stina Torjesen & Indra Øverland  
The purpose of this report is twofold: to offer an in-depth analysis of the role 
of international election observation missions during the political upheaval 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and to present the work of leading young academics 
from Kyrgyzstan. This is the first scholarly publication within the project 
‘NUPI Network for Election Observation and Exchange’.1  
Kyrgyzstan is an interesting case, for two reasons. First, whether 
willingly or unwillingly, the international election observer missions played 
a central part in the events that eventually led to the toppling of the 
administration of President Askar Akaev. Second, Kyrgyzstan highlights the 
immense challenges that face election observation missions in the non-
consolidated democracies of the former Soviet Union. Many of these 
countries, Kyrgyzstan included, have developed traditions of deep-seated 
and sophisticated manipulation of election procedures. Given these two 
features, how were the international election observation missions carried 
out in Kyrgyzstan? The three articles presented here provide differing 
answers and insights on this issue.  
Kyrgyzstan was in 2005 (and arguably still is in 2006) a non-consolidated 
democracy. At a superficial level Kyrgyzstan embodied key features of a 
liberal democracy. It had elected officials, frequent elections and a 
constitution articulating liberal principles. There were relatively high levels 
of freedom of expression, and the populace had access to alternative sources 
of information. People were free to form independent associations, and there 
was inclusive citizenship (See Dahl, 2002.). There were also, however, some 
striking visible shortcomings. These included little or no change in political 
leaders and the political elite since 1991, and the dominance of the executive 
over the judicial and legal branches.  
Additional and less apparent features of Kyrgyzstan’s political system 
were closely associated with the composition of state structures themselves. 
Arguably the state was not so much a coherent top–down governing 
                                                     
1
 The key aims of this project have been to enhance the participation of 
observers from Moldova, Central Asia and the Caucasus in international 
observation missions and to facilitate research on the role of election 
observation in democratic developments in Moldova, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. Further information on the project is presented in a 
separate section of this report. 
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structure, as an arena where informal groups competed for position, 
influence and resources. Kyrgyzstan exhibited many features of a ‘patronage 
democracy’: a democracy in which access to resources, jobs and services is 
concentrated in the state; and elected or appointed officials have the power 
to distribute these resources to voters and associates, which they prefer to do 
in an personalised, rather than formalised, way. (See Chandra, 2004.) This 
was paralleled with the near-total absence of movements, interest groups or 
political parties that could coherently channel specific political demands or 
platforms stemming from the broader populace to the level of the governing 
elites. With a few exceptions, most of Kyrgyzstan’s independent associations 
had been elite NGOs or person-centred political parties. Politics was more 
about the competition for scarce goods through securing access to 
government positions – and less about competing political visions for the 
development of the country.  
Moreover, Kyrgyzstan had inherited from Soviet times a long and deep-
seated tradition of holding elections as manipulated and symbolic spectacles 
rather than as expressions of the preferences of the voting public. This 
merged with manipulation techniques that developed in the post-1991 
transition period. New and sophisticated ways of manipulating democratic 
processes have taken hold in many post-Soviet countries, argues Andrew 
Wilson in his Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World 
(2005). He highlights how the administrative machinery of the state on the 
local and central levels has been mobilised so as to secure a favourable 
outcomes for those in power; how opposition groups and parties create 
‘clones’ so as to deflect attention away from real opponents; and how 
widespread ‘black PR’ from central media outlets undermines opponents. 
Wilson’s book underlines, as does Karagulova’s article on Kyrgyzstan in this 
volume, the fact that most regimes in former Soviet space employ proactive, 
deliberate and comprehensive strategies to manipulate election processes and 
their outcomes. Similarly, Susan Hyde (forthcoming) has pointed out that 
international election observer missions may have encouraged innovations in 
cheating during elections. She terms this cheating ‘prudent manipulation’ – 
the idea being that rulers, like the Machiavellian ‘Prince’, know ‘when to be 
good and when not to be good, while maintaining at all times a superficial 
appearance of goodness’.  
What were the implications of these aspects of Kyrgyzstan’s political 
system for election observation missions in 2005? An immediate implication 
was that any efforts to uncover manipulation became a political act, since 
manipulation was such a central feature of the ruling elites’ political 
strategies. As Elnura Osmonalieva points out in her article in this volume: 
‘[the election observers’] presence was an annoyance to [the heads of the 
Precinct Election Commissions] on a very stressful day. It was often a 
hindrance: it is hard to cheat, intimidate, bribe and falsify when there are 
people around who do not depend on you in any way, and who have the 
authority and possibility of telling the wider audience that you cheat, and, 
more importantly, to the bosses in [the capital] that you did not manage to 
cover up the cheating.’  
The formal and informal political practices of Kyrgyzstan and other 
countries that share features of ‘patronage democracies’ raise questions as to 
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what should be the criteria for labelling an election ‘free and fair’. In what 
ways – if any – is, for example, vote buying a violation of free and fair 
election procedures? Do we have the appropriate methodologies to capture 
sophisticated manipulation strategies – and is it the role of international 
election observation missions to do so?  
These are questions in urgent need of debate, but unfortunately they do 
not fully fall within the proper scope of this volume. The purpose here is 
merely to highlight the challenges that have faced election observation in 
Kyrgyzstan – and to do so through presenting assessments from scholars 
from Kyrgyzstan.  
The articles collected in this volume examine various aspects of election 
observation. A key argument that surfaces in all three articles, despite the 
differences in focus, is that election observation often becomes a political 
activity – whether or not the mission organisers make efforts to either 
prevent or augment participation in the political struggles associated with 
elections. 
Emil Juraev, in his ‘Election observation: an institution under threat? The 
case of Kyrgyzstan’, profiles the various international observation missions 
that operated in Kyrgyzstan during the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. His article highlights the sharp differences in how these missions 
reported on the elections, and argues that the government deliberately 
ensured that there were ‘pro-government’ election missions operating, as a 
strategy to neutralise the effect of critical observation reports. Juraev also 
voices significant concern over the future of election observation as an 
international institution, noting that the work of all international missions 
during the presidential elections in July 2005 was highly problematic.  
 ‘Danger ahead: the government discourse in Kyrgyzstan on elections and 
observation before 24 March 2005’ by Anara Karagulova examines the 
rhetorical tactics that government-affiliated media used against protest 
movements, opposition politicians and election observation missions prior to 
the ousting of President Askar Akaev on 24 March 2005. The article presents 
fascinating material from three major newspapers in Kyrgyzstan in the 
period January–March 2005. Karagulova uses the insights of discourse 
theory and critical security studies as a starting point for assessing how the 
government media affixed notions of ‘danger’ and labels such as 
‘indigenous/alien’ to local and international actors – including observation 
missions. Her article indicates that the government-affiliated media 
published news stories and comments that carried biases against some 
observation missions. In many cases the media also failed to report when 
official statements of the observer missions noted failures or shortcomings. 
Karagulova argues that the negative information campaign against foreign 
activities, including international observation missions, in advance of the 
elections undermined the activities and statements of observers during and 
after the elections.  
Elnura Osmonalieva discusses the important roles played by interpreters 
in election observation in ‘Wearing two hats: interpreting during election 
monitoring in Kyrgyzstan’. She debates this in the context of the elections in 
2000 and 2005, with particular reference to her experiences as interpreter in 
Jalalabad province and the constituency of Kurmanbek Bakiev during the 
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parliament elections in February and March 2005. The article highlights the 
many important intended and unintended functions interpreters take on. It 
also voices concern over the level of recognition, status and training that 
international observation missions tend to give interpreters. Osmonalieva 
points out the difficulties that observers and interpreters have in appearing as 
neutral observers, and how international observers are often seen as affiliated 
with particular political segments in a county. 
  
 
Election Observation:  
An Institution Under Threat?  
The Case of Kyrgyzstan  
Emil Juraev 
1.Introduction 
 
This contribution looks at international election observation in Kyrgyzstan 
during the two national elections in 2005. International election observation 
is an institution in the important sense of being a time-tested norm or 
practice, accepted and respected internationally. Its place in the architecture 
of international governance is widely recognised.  
Here it will be argued that the original ideas behind this international 
practice – in terms of the ends to be achieved – are certainly still present. 
These include: fairness and honesty; legality and legitimacy; the 
transparency and ‘democraticness’ of the conduct; and the results of the 
elections. But in practice, the original aims are not the only ends to which 
international election observation is used. The case under consideration 
shows the various and at times contradictory ends to which such observation 
may be conducted. 
In presenting this case, the article also invites further academic research 
on the theme of election observation, especially of international observation. 
Whilst there are plenty of scholarly works on most other topics related to 
elections, election observation has, oddly enough, received very little 
attention.2 Yet the effect of observation on electoral processes, and the 
broader (and not readily visible) implications of observation on various 
political structures, would seem to warrant more focused study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
  One significant input to the academic study of international election observation should 
be the forthcoming doctoral dissertation by Susan Hyde at the University of California, 
San Diego. See also Bjornlund, 2004.  
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 Sources  
 
The paper is primarily based on the reports, and other documents, of the 
various election observation missions sent to Kyrgyzstan for the 2005 
parliamentary and presidential elections.  
These reports carry different perspectives and cannot be taken as ultimate 
sources of ‘the truth’. However, the reports, and other public statements 
made by the missions, form a good starting point for discussion. Along with 
the observations made on the election days themselves, these texts are 
perhaps the most appropriate basis from which to draw some conclusions 
about these missions. 
Other sources for this contribution include: media coverage of these 
missions (in various forms); published interviews with relevant persons; and 
a few select, informal interviews with individuals involved in the 
observation. The scholarly literature on election monitoring has not been 
consulted to any substantial extent, as the main intention here has been to 
offer some field considerations which in turn may contribute to further, 
larger-scale research. 
 
 A Cause for Concern 
 
The most important observation that this paper puts forward is that, in the 
cases observed, international monitoring missions were clearly implicated in 
political games. This calls for caution in how the institution is understood 
and applied, lest it ultimately lose credibility and respect. When 
implemented true to its principles of impartiality and objectivity, 
international election observation is very important. It is a strong instrument 
for making elections cleaner, more honest, more democratic and more 
transparent. It is also an authoritative voice that can protect the legitimacy 
and respectability of elected governments (and representatives) in young 
democracies against ill-devised slander and contestation. These important 
tasks of international observation require that such missions be carried out 
with the utmost seriousness of purpose and care. 
 
2. Kyrgyzstan in 2005 
 
Kyrgyzstan was scheduled to have two national elections in 2005. The first 
was the parliamentary election, which was held as scheduled on 27 February 
and 13 March. The second election, however, had to be held in July, rather 
than at the end of October as originally planned. The mass demonstrations 
that culminated in the removal from power of Kyrgyzstan’s first president, 
Askar Akaev (now known as ‘The Tulip Revolution’)3, caused the 
presidential election to be moved forward to 10 July. The way in which this 
                                                     
3
  What to call this event has itself been a perhaps over-debated question. Besides calling it 
a popular revolution, other suggestions included coup d’etat, ‘putch’, leadership change, 
and even pogrom. In this paper,  ‘revolution’ will be used, while acknowledging that it is 
a contested term. 
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popular revolution took place, and what caused it, as well as what it in turn 
caused, are of direct relevance to the more general topic of election 
observation.  
 
 Democracy in Kyrgyzstan: Theory and Practice 
 
Ever since gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan has made clear its 
determination to build a democracy. Indeed, this is reflected in its 
Constitution. Former President Akaev kept emphasising how democracy was 
a target – unlike some of the other presidents of the former Soviet countries, 
who changed their rhetoric from ‘democracy now’, to ‘first economy, then 
politics’,4 or some other convenient formula. Elections, truly seen as 
‘instruments of democracy’ (to borrow from Bingham Powell’s book title of 
2000), have regularly been carried out in the country – also unlike the case in 
many other countries.5 In almost all elections for positions in government 
and representation, multiple candidates have competed for limited seats. 
Several referenda (an instrument of direct democracy), whatever their virtues 
might be, have also been held in less than fifteen years of independence. 
The controversial point concerned the quality of these elections and 
referenda. Many in Kyrgyzstan came to view these alleged attributes of 
democracy as sheer hypocrisy on the part of the government, with President 
Akaev at the forefront. Elections were held with regularity and the people 
were asked to make decisions on important issues through referenda. 
Furthermore, there were other obvious democratic attributes to the election 
process, such as the diversity of the press, multiplicity of the political parties, 
and a large NGO sector. Yet these factors were dismissed as ways of giving 
an impression of democracy, rather than genuinely building it. From one 
electoral cycle to another, the public perception had been that manipulation 
had grown more sophisticated, and that the election results were more and 
more corrupt. The culmination of this ever-growing election manipulation 
came with the 2005 parliamentary election, where the complex government 
scenario included the organisation of loyal election observation teams.  
What were probably the best elections under Akaev were the first, in 
1991, when his presidency was confirmed in a national election for the first 
time.6 Those elections were not competitive: Askar Akaev was the only 
person running for presidency. Much in the fashion of the Soviet times, the 
percentage of voters supporting this single candidate was in the upper 
nineties. All the same, this is widely seen as being the best election because 
it was conducted in a manner almost devoid of the illegal schemes which 
were to become rites of the later elections. Akaev had been serving as the 
president of the then Soviet Kyrgyz Republic since the autumn of 1990; at 
                                                     
4
  This is the formula popularly known to be implemented by President Karimov of 
Uzbekistan. The author recalls strong defence of this notion, with reference to Karimov’s 
books, by Uzbek students at regional Central Asian student events. 
5
  In all other four countries of Central Asia, most famously led by Turkmenistan’s 
President Niyazov, incumbent presidents have extended their terms in office through 
referenda, without going to elections. 
6
  This observation was made by many people during the parliamentary elections of 2005, 
leading up to 24 March. 
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that point the previous leader of the country had been voted out of office by 
the parliament. Akaev had been voted in, a new politician recruited from the 
sphere of academia. The reasoning goes that, as his political experience 
grew, he learned and began to use methods of political manipulation in later 
events. These included: shuffling government positions; holding frequent 
nationwide referenda; using respected elderly people to speak in his favour; 
and the manipulation of elections. Back in 1991, these were not attributes of 
his political character.  
 
 The Electoral Revolution 
 
The ‘high point’ of this quasi-experimentation with democracy, the 
revolution of March 2005, may have been possible due to various conditions 
in Kyrgyz politics. In particular, however, it was due to certain peculiarities 
of the parliamentary elections of that year. The term ‘electoral revolutions’ 
applies to the Kyrgyz case as strongly as it does to other recent revolutions 
(see e.g. Silitski, 2005). In Georgia, Ukraine, and earlier in Eastern Europe, 
just as in Kyrgyzstan, elections provided the immediate triggers for these 
revolutions. In each case, the conduct of the elections was fiercely 
challenged, and this presented the windows of opportunity that enabled the 
long-suppressed dissatisfaction and protest to become mobilised and burst 
into open action.  
 
 Ground Conditions 
 
The ground conditions for the Kyrgyz revolution were such that many 
people did not expect anything radical to happen. The country’s long-term 
problems (corruption, poverty, and a growing sense of the unfair 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the political elite) were all seen as 
constant. The period immediately prior to the elections was not seen as being 
radically different from the months and years before. The limited freedom 
within the political realm was certainly not greater than at any earlier time; 
even though there were opposition parties and politicians (as well as an 
opposition-minded media, and NGOs), repression of their activities, and 
limitations on what they could effectively do, were in place as always. The 
long-standing problem of the opposition being highly disconcerted and 
fragmented remained largely the same. There were changes on this point 
only in a very short period leading up to 24 March. Under such conditions, 
many factors were potentially conducive to a change of regime by force, but 
they had existed for some years already; nothing pointed to a possible 
escalation of action in March, had it not been for the elections. 
 
 The Catalyst 
 
The elections were the trigger that led to the escalation of protest. Most 
commentators, particularly election observers, acknowledge that the conduct 
of the parliamentary elections was very problematic. Contrary to the rhetoric 
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of the officials, and particularly of President Akaev (who claimed that they 
were calling for, and promising, free and honest elections), the actual 
elections were carried out amidst blatant corruption, selective application of 
legal restrictions, and the massive use of so-called administrative resources.  
The specific tricks of manipulation used in the 2005 parliamentary 
election were somewhat different. Instead of attempting to get the desired 
outcomes by falsifying voting results, as had previously occurred, the greater 
emphasis was on the campaign period. Vote buying, de-registration of strong 
opponents, placing obstacles to the campaigns of opposition candidates, and 
many other tricks were applied. On Election Day, the new trick that was 
used was to publicise widely, on TV and newspapers, the highly favourable 
and ‘legitimising’ opinions of certain foreign election observers. Overall, 
this strategy was quite successful – but then it backfired, less than two weeks 
later. The overly aggressive, overly hypocritical, and overly ‘all-
encompassing’ strategy triggered a similarly aggressive, critical and all-out 
reaction.7 
 
3. International Election Observation Missions 
and their Election Assessments 
 
All elections in Kyrgyzstan have been attended by election observers, both 
local and international. The number of international election observers has 
grown steadily with each election. This year, during the two rounds of 
elections, an unprecedented number of outsiders were watching the conduct 
of the peoples’ choice. A record number of observers came for the 
presidential elections: the Central Election Commission (CEC) accredited 
947 foreign observers, as well as 277 foreign journalists.8 At each election, 
the government has attached high importance to international observation 
missions.  
 
 
 The Parliamentary Elections 
 International Groups 
 
The major international groups observing the parliamentary elections were: 
 
• the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), 
composed of missions from the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Office for Democratic 
                                                     
7
 Various publications analyse and describe the 24 March events. For a good comprehensive 
analysis, see the International Crisis Group (2005)  
8
 For this and more details on each monitoring mission see the CEC website: 
http://www.shailoo.gov.kg/president/akkredit/?all=1 Information on the monitoring of 
parliamentary elections is not available; very likely because of the presence of rather 
shady monitoring groups, as noted further down. 
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Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament;  
• the European Network of Election Monitoring Organisations 
(ENEMO); 
• The Commonwealth of Independent States election observation 
mission (CIS);9  
• the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation observers (SCO);   
• the London International Democratic Institute (LIDI).  
 
Most observers arrived only a few days before Election Day, but some 
(particularly from the IEOM, ENEMO and CIS) were present to observe the 
election campaign period as well.  
 
 Conclusions of the Reports 
 
Of the written reports by the observation missions on the parliamentary 
elections that were made available, all agreed on only few points. This 
included recognition of the increased competition in almost all districts, and 
some positive vote transparency and anti-fraud measures (specifically, 
finger-inking and transparent ballot boxes).  
 
As for the remaining points, the reports exhibited important differences.  
 
IEOM and ENEMO were critical to the elections, whilst the CIS, 
Shanghai and LIDI groups declared the elections to be satisfactory. Actually, 
the latter two did not produce any official reports, and their assessments 
were primarily made public through media coverage.10 The CIS report 
deemed the 13 March (run-up) parliamentary elections ‘legitimate, free and 
transparent’,11 while the IEOM report concluded that the same elections ‘fell 
short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for 
democratic elections, in a number of important areas’.12  
In election observation reports, the most important and most cited points 
concern compliance with international standards (in particular, in terms of 
legitimacy, fairness, and transparency). However, any report will have 
further details on the observed violations, achievements, improvements, or 
deterioration, and so on. If we look at these details, then the CIS observation 
report is not a completely uncritical document. It notes several problematic 
areas, including voter lists, the status of both local and international 
                                                     
9
  The CIS election observation mission here is different from non-governmental 
organisation called CIS-EMO, which also conducts observation, and which observed 
presidential elections in KR as a separate team of 29 persons. This curious coincidence 
in the name of the organisation is noted in a Eurasianet.org article, see note 28. 
10
   CIS monitoring is reported in a medium sized not-very-formal paper, though a more 
formal report is said to come for delivery to member-state officials at a later point. 
Curiously, the most criticised report on 27 February vote is unavailable (the link for it 
produces the 10 July vote report instead). See: http://www.ec-
cis.org/main.aspx?uid=1774  
11
   Ibid.  
12
 IEOM Final Report on parliamentary election observation, p. 1  
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observers, some procedural shortcomings during the actual voting, as well as 
a few comments on the campaigning process (including ‘public speeches 
violating the dignity and honour of the citizens and certain candidates’).13 
On the whole, however, the CIS report is characterised by its conciliatory 
and mild tone, as well as the absence of any serious criticism, and repeated 
assertions that all the reported problems did not affect the overall quality of 
the elections. 
The IEOM report has a much harsher tone, and cites more serious 
violations. Briefly noting the positive fact of the competitiveness of the 
elections, with wide choices, the report notes that this was undermined 
‘noticeably in the run-up to both of the rounds of voting, by widespread 
vote-buying, de-registration of candidates, interference with the independent 
media, and a low level of confidence in electoral and judicial institutions on 
the part of candidates and voters’. On the same page, the report lists several 
areas where major shortcomings were observed, all involving the pre-
election period and election-preparation administration. Of the Election Day 
observations, the IEOM report notes: ‘incidents of vote buying, infringement 
of the secrecy of the vote, pressure on students, multiple voting, and voter 
intimidation were directly observed’. In addition to the IEOM official 
conclusions, in a separate paper, a member of IEOM from Nordem, Linda 
Kartawich, specified voter education, voter registration, freedom of the 
media, and gender issues as areas in need of improvement. 
While the differences in the texts of the two major reports are not as stark 
as may appear from the three-word conclusions, neither are they very close. 
Hence, ‘legitimate, fair and transparent’ accurately describes the overall tone 
of the CIS observers. By contrast, the gist of IEOM’s report is quite well 
captured in the accounts of the failure to meet international standards in ‘a 
number of important areas’. The conclusions of the LIDI and SCO 
observers, stated in less formal ways, were in line with the CIS assessment, 
and at times more resolutely approving than the latter. The report of the 
ENEMO mission was consonant with IEOM but much harsher. The 
Summary of Conclusions section opens as follows: ‘though both rounds of 
elections were conducted in a peaceful manner, many violations took place 
which seriously influenced the outcome of the elections. ENEMO has 
concluded that the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan fell dramatically 
short of minimum international standards for free and fair democratic 
elections’.14 
LIDI (of which nothing has been heard or can be found after the 
parliamentary elections), made a statement on 14 March, which was 
published by the Kyrgyzinfo news agency and reprinted in the newspaper 
Vecherniy Bishkek,15 concluding that the elections were ‘legitimate and fair’. 
‘Like the first round of elections, this round was conducted in a professional 
manner. State organs responsible for the elections once again achieved 
                                                     
13
    Op. cit., at: http://www.ec-cis.org/main.aspx?uid=1774  
14
  ENEMO Statement on Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan, p. 1.  
15
   The statement appeared in the newspaper, as a reprint from Kyrgyzinfo website, on 14 
March, indicating the statement had was already been made on 14 March, the actual day 
of elections. See ‘Legitimny I Spravedlivy’ at: 
http://www.vb.kg/2005/03/14/tema/2.html  
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success in the provision of guarantees for independence and impartiality of 
the whole electoral process, in the essential majority of the electoral districts 
and precincts.’  
 
 The Presidential Elections 
 
While these assessments were still being discussed, and the two opposing 
views of the elections were still being sorted out,16 events took a rather 
unexpected turn. On 24 March, President Akaev abandoned the country, and 
the Government House was taken by the opposition and the demonstrating 
crowd. After a short period of governmental void, a new interim 
government, led by Kurmanbek Bakiev, was able to establish itself and 
effectively claim control of the country. After some discussions within the 
government and the parliament,17 early presidential elections were scheduled 
for 10 July.  
In the period between the two elections, the OSCE-ODIHR mission 
produced several interim reports and an interim recommendations 
document.18 These documents, together with the recommendations after the 
parliamentary elections, were favourably received, and to some extent acted 
upon by the Central Elections Commission of the Kyrgyz Republic. Major 
issues requiring immediate attention and action, as emphasised in these 
recommendations, included the following: the composition and competence 
of the district and precinct electoral commissions; the independence of CEC 
itself; the quality of the voter lists; interference by local administration 
officials in the electoral process; and various issues relating to the pre-
election campaign period (access to media, freedom to campaign, a level 
playing-field, and more). As noted in the IEOM Preliminary Report after the 
presidential elections, several of these important recommendations were 
implemented, though many others remained unchanged. 
There were some changes made to the composition of the observation 
teams for the presidential election. This time, there was no London 
organisation. However, a large number of CIS, ENEMO and IEOM 
observers arrived, more than in the parliamentary elections. This time, 
assessment reports did not contain any principal disagreements, and all of 
the missions noted significant improvements in meeting OSCE and other 
democratic election standards.  
 
 Problems During the Presidential Elections  
 
In an election seen by many to be more of a referendum for the approval of 
Kurmanbek Bakiev than a truly contested multi-candidate election, and in a 
                                                     
16
   A BBC news report carried a controversial official Russian statement, negative to the  
OSCE’s critical report, on 21 March. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/4369065/stm#  
17
   Today’s KR Parliament is the one elected in February and March 2005, despite these 
elections being the principal reason for 21 March. This was a long and difficult process, 
not discussed here for reasons of space and theme.  
18
   All accessible at: http://www1.osce.org/odihr-elections/14475.html  
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supportive international (Western) environment, there were nevertheless 
some important problems noted by observer missions. In particular, these 
included irregularities in voter lists and vote counts.19 In an attempt to ‘clean 
up’ voter lists, significant numbers of people who were known to be outside 
of the country, but who had not changed their residence, were crossed out.20 
As for the vote-counting process, several observed instances of serious ballot 
stuffing were reported.21 Both the voter list problem and the ballot stuffing 
apparently stemmed from the same fear: turnout was far too low for the 
election to take place (it was less than 50%). There were some incredible 
instances when the national turnout jumped by an unrealistic percentage in 
very short time. One instance cited in the IEOM report involved a rural 
precinct where 630 voters were reported to have cast their ballots in only 50 
minutes.22  
 
General Improvements 
 
The positive changes in the presidential elections were seen in the campaign 
period, where both statements and actions were made in order to provide 
equal chances for all candidates to reach the voters. The illegal use of 
governmental resources was reduced significantly, though not completely 
eliminated. Candidates had significantly improved access to media coverage, 
as did the voters to information about the candidates. Besides extensive 
advertising on the national TV channel, there were candidate debates, 
organised by the CEC and aired live. Other improvements that were noted 
were the formation of the local election commissions, and the greater 
independence of media and electoral commissions from government 
pressure.  
4. The ‘Politicisation’ of International Election 
Observation 
 
During the two elections in Kyrgyzstan, a new element to international 
election observation missions was noted, in addition to their being simply 
what the name indicates. Besides providing observation reports, which 
claimed to be impartial, international election observation missions found 
themselves drawn into the broader political picture that existed around these 
elections. They were not really (seen as) entirely impartial, interest-free, and 
empty of political content or onlookers. Particularly during the parliamentary 
elections, the various observer groups, by their public presence, were clearly 
politically engaged – which means that they were not serving the idea behind 
this institution of international observation. 
                                                     
19
  Ibid. See also ENEMO Preliminary Report on findings  
20
   Statement of Preliminary Conclusions, IEOM, p. 7. 
21
   ENEMO Preliminary Report on Findings.  
22
  IEOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, p. 12. 
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As noted in the previous section, the parliamentary elections witnessed 
five major international observer groups: IEOM (OSCE PA, OSCE ODIHR, 
EU Parliament), ENEMO, CIS, SCO and the elusive London International 
Democratic Institute (as an independent group). All these groups, apart from 
the London institute, took part in the presidential election observation in July 
of 2005. An important question is, which of these observation groups were 
serious and professional, and which were truly impartial and willing to 
report what they actually saw? While they all observed the same election, 
their reactions varied in some important ways. 
 
 Examining the CIS  
 
An article by Roman Kupchinsky published on the webpages of Eurasia 
Insight, on 2 April 2005, titled ‘CIS: Monitoring the Election Monitors,’ 
offers a quick introduction to the controversy involving election observers in 
the recent elections in several CIS countries. This example is also indicative 
of the possible political engagements that international observers might have 
had in the recent elections in Kyrgyzstan. 
Kupchinsky (2005) reports on the Ukrainian government’s criticism of, 
and unwillingness to be part of ‘[the CIS] Election Monitoring Organisation, 
which is a group that has gained notoriety by regularly proclaiming that the 
elections in the former Soviet republics are free and fair, in contrast to other 
monitoring groups that find the same elections to be flawed.’ 
Further on, considerable evidence is given of cases where the reports of 
the CIS and OSCE observer missions consistently differed in predictable 
ways: the former would find all elections in the CIS which ended in 
Moscow-friendly outcomes to be fair, legitimate and transparent, whereas 
the latter would be critical. ‘This practice [of CIS monitoring], seen by many 
as nothing more than a KGB ‘disinformation’ operation left over from Soviet 
times, consists of groups of trusted CIS employees, from the secretariat in 
Minsk, who roam the CIS to observe elections and invariably announce that 
they are transparent, fair, and democratic, providing that the more pro-
Kremlin candidates wins.’ Notably, as Kupchinsky reports, the assessments 
of the CIS and OSCE observers exchanged polls in the repeated presidential 
elections in the Ukraine; CIS approved the one where Viktor Yanukovych 
emerged as the winner, and was strongly critical of the one that announced 
Viktor Yushchenko as winner. The converse was true of the OSCE 
monitoring reports.  
While Kupchinsky’s reading of CIS monitoring as ‘ploys of the Kremlin’ 
should be read with caution (though one should not wholly discount such a 
possibility), the truth of the controversial reports on the elections is obvious 
and verifiable. The same group centrally monitored the parliamentary 
elections in Kyrgyzstan in February and March 2005. As reported in the 
newspaper Vecherniy Bishkek, on the day of the first round of the 
parliamentary elections, the CIS head monitor and current Chair of the CIS 
Executive Committee, Vladimir Rushaylo, commented that he had ‘no 
significant criticism of the conduct of the elections’ at that time.23 Another 
                                                     
23
   ‘V rabochem rezhime’ , Vecherniy Bishkek, 28 Feb. 2005, p. 1.  
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member of this group, who observed one of the electoral districts, made a 
separate comment: ‘There are no principal differences in our electoral 
systems. Everything is transparent and democratic. There were no serious 
violations in the district.’24 
The CIS election monitoring missions have been notorious for their 
consistent approval and praise of all of the elections in the region. A random 
search on the Internet on CIS election observation missions came up with a 
Wikipedia entry which describes a continued record of disagreements of 
various election assessments between the CIS and OSCE observers.25 After 
the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, this CIS-OSCE observation 
standoff found expression in a BBC news report which quoted a statement 
from the Russian Foreign Ministry criticising the OSCE report. In the wake 
of the broad public protests in various electoral districts, Russia ‘rebuked 
[the OSCE] for declaring that the elections had fallen short of democratic 
standards. It urged the body to be ‘more responsible’ in its election 
monitoring conclusions in order to prevent destructive elements from using 
these assessments to justify their lawless actions’.26 
This shows that there was a Russian role behind the CIS election 
‘whitewashing’, and it also gives a clue as to the Russian perspective on 
what election observation is about.27 At face value, the comment above 
conveys the view that an election observation report should be ‘responsible’, 
or preferably approving of an election, in order to prevent threats to public 
peace. Certainly, this interpretation is subject to further qualification when 
the broader Russian foreign policy stance towards the OSCE, the West and 
their democratisation projects is considered; Russia has been orchestrating 
consistent CIS criticism of the work of the OSCE since early 2000, largely 
fuelled by OSCE criticisms of most of these countries for their undemocratic 
political processes.  
 
 Other Missions 
 
Besides the controversial CIS mission, there were two other curious 
international election observation missions at work during the parliamentary 
elections: the London International Democratic Institute and the Chinese 
electoral observers’ mission.  
 
 The London International Democratic Institute 
 
                                                     
24
   ‘Nasha aktivnost’ udivila rossiyan’, Vecherniy Bishkek, 28 February 2005  
25
  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIS_election_observation_missions  
26
  See ‘Protests Cause Kyrgyz Poll Review, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/4369065/stm#  
27
  An interesting discussion is offered on several private discussion sites, such 
democracyguy.com, registan.ru, and others. On this instance, where OSCE missions are 
also said to be not always impartial and exemplary, see ‘Russia Picking a Fight over 
Kyrgyzstan’, at: http://democracyguy.typepad.com/democracy_guy_grassroots 
_/2005/03/russia_picking.html  
Election Observation: An Institution Under Threat? 19 
Attempts to locate this organisation through Internet search engines did not 
produce any results (for any possible variations of the title of this reputed 
organisation). On 27 February, Election Day, representatives of this 
organisation were commenting on the process of the elections in general, and 
conclusively approving the terms. According to normal election observation 
rules, individual observers may not make general evaluative comments about 
the elections during election day itself. (See Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 
2001: 20.) This organisation did not produce any reports, nor was it heard 
from after the elections, but it had a visible profile in the media coverage on 
the days of the elections on 27 February and 13 March.  
 
 The Chinese Electoral Observers’ Mission28 
 
While this group did not make prominent comments about the quality of the 
elections, the national TV and newspapers frequently presented them as 
being further evidence of the international attention on Kyrgyzstan’s 
elections. The Chinese, like the London organisation, were not in any 
prominent exchange with the OSCE or ENEMO assessments, but their very 
presence is indicative of the possibilities of international election 
observation; as discovered in a personal interview with this group, their main 
interest was of rather a geopolitical nature, and they sounded more like an 
intelligence-gathering group than election observers. They appeared more 
interested in learning the set-up of US, European and Russian interests in 
Kyrgyzstan, and the possible future scenarios for these geo-strategic interest 
set-ups. In their capacity as election observers, they were shown and briefly 
interviewed on TV several times, and they dutifully stated favourable 
comments. 
 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections: Results and Analysis 
 
Four months later, the early presidential elections saw the universal approval 
of the conduct of elections in all its aspects. There were remarks about 
various insignificant problems, but these had not broadly affected the overall 
outcome.  
 
 Shifting Perspectives  
 
Contrary to the parliamentary election environment, the presidential 
elections did not seem to reveal obvious political involvement amongst the 
observation groups. If this is true, it is a good sign, but the very change in the 
tone amongst the various groups, in such an abrupt way, invites critical 
inquiry. We may have been observing a more balanced and objective 
assessment by the CIS and other missions, whose opinions were vividly 
inconsistent during the actual conduct of the parliamentary election vote. 
(See CIS Statement of International Observers on Presidential Elections.) On 
                                                     
28
  The author personally met with all members of this group upon their request, for 
interview just before the elections. 
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the other hand, the assessments by OSCE and other previously critical 
observation missions appear to be overly approving of the presidential 
elections where important problems apparently persisted. Arguably, some of 
the problems seen during the latter elections were quite serious, and not 
insignificant. Ballot stuffing is perhaps the most serious violation in a voting 
process; the turnout numbers jumped rapidly across the country, which 
indicates that the ballot stuffing was not rare. The ‘cleansing’ of the voter 
lists (where the names of many thousands of voters were removed), was also 
very significant. However, the usually critical OSCE and ENEMO 
commented on these rather mildly. This uncritical assessment may be 
explained by the international community’s choice to give the new 
government a helping hand, or a voucher of legitimacy. Nevertheless, it 
represents a mild compromise of the idea of international election 
observation. 
 
 The Challenges of Election Observation 
 
The work of the various international election observation missions in 
Kyrgyzstan in these elections stands as a clear illustration of the possible 
ways in which observers can become politically engaged. It is perhaps 
impossible to be neutral as an election observer. However, it is quite 
possible, and required, that the observer should be impartial and objective in 
assessing the events. Impartiality and objectivity were compromised in 
Kyrgyzstan, by CIS and some other observers in the parliamentary elections, 
and arguably by all observers in the presidential elections. The idea behind 
international election observation is to observe the fairness and lawfulness of 
the elections, and, when and if that happens, to provide support for the 
legitimacy of the elected officials against accusations. During the 
parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, legitimacy was given to the election 
results, even though these were clearly flawed, and the resulting criticisms 
were discredited, even though they were objective and unbiased. There was a 
clear attempt to use election observers for a cause was exactly the opposite 
of what they ought to serve.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The year 2005 was remarkable in the history of independent Kyrgyzstan. It 
is certain to be remembered in the future as a turning point, by both critics 
and supporters. It was the year when the fourteen-year-long reign of the first 
post-independence president of Kyrgyzstan was cut short. It was the year of 
two national elections, which proved not to be habitual and routine, but 
milestones of the process that started, and completed, a change of regime. 
From the very beginning, the quality of the conduct of the elections was a 
major concern. Experience from past elections had led to heavy pressure to 
make special efforts for a more honest, and hence more legitimate, election 
that year. In this atmosphere, the role of the international observers was 
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important. The government, the opposition and civil society all saw the 
institution of international election observation as a strong instrument which 
could help to ensure honest and legitimate elections. 
In both the parliamentary and presidential voting, many hundreds of 
observers from abroad were present, witnessing the Kyrgyzstan voters make 
their choices. The exclusive impact of these observation missions on the 
unexpected developments after the parliamentary elections is difficult to 
assess. However, considerable attention was given to these missions, and to 
what they said. The missions had somewhat mutually contradictory and 
publicly controversial assessments to offer, and various groups had high 
profiles among various audiences. While the actual exclusive input of the 
observers into the important events in March may not be quantifiable, it is 
surely significant. Using the example of their own contradictory reports, the 
observation missions, taken together, provided strong evidence of flawed 
parliamentary elections. 
This paper has sought to consider the intended and possible roles of 
international election observation. It has offered a brief overview of the role 
of international observation in the outstanding 2005 election cycle in 
Kyrgyzstan, and indicated new questions that can be asked about 
international election observation, new problems to be aware of, and new 
areas for attention. While all these suggestions are significant, the most 
important suggestion is that international election observation should be 
recognised as an important institution. In the example of Kyrgyzstan, it 
should be obvious that when an undemocratic, corrupt regime pays so much 
attention to this institution – if only to use it to corrupt the elections – such 
an institution must be very significant. International election observation 
contains a strong potential, not yet realised, for the international democratic 
community to strengthen and expand its ranks around the world.  
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The Government Discourse on 
the Elections and Observation 
Before 24 March 2005  
 
Anara Karagulova 
1. Introduction 
 
Arena for Change: the Parliamentary Election in Kyrgyzstan  
 
The string of ‘colour revolutions’ in the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) focused global attention on the parliamentary 
election in Kyrgyzstan on 27 February These elections were marked to be an 
‘arena for the next revolution’. International organisations, NGOs, 
opposition representatives and governments took action in order to secure 
free and fair elections. This time it was not simply another election, but a 
turning point. The Kyrgyz people, the opposition and the international 
community had been waiting for a change in power and a time when former 
President Askar Akaev would step down. Also the media were important in 
these events, with both the government and the opposition seeking to 
influence the minds of the people.  
 
 Government Discourse Management 
 
This article argues that, prior to the parliamentary elections in February 
2005, the Akaev government created a discourse of danger and instability. In 
this discourse, the key threat was the potential for chaos in the situation of a 
‘revolution’ generated by outside forces. It was developed in order to de-
legitimise the opposition and influence the public opinion. This situation 
created difficulties for election observers: their impartiality, independence 
and objectivity were questioned. For instance, the OSCE mission, being 
associated with the ‘West’ and ‘Western outside forces,’ was expected to 
side with the opposition.  
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In the following we look at this discourse around the ‘political instability’ 
and the responsibility of the ‘outside forces’, and present reflections on the 
‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ programme created by Akaev. The following section 
discusses how the existing discourse continued in relation to election 
observers, including the OSCE mission and the exit polls. Finally, some 
reflections are offered on the reports of international observers. 
 
 
 Government Discourse Management and the Media 
 A Voice through the Media 
 
The pre-election period, January–March 2005, is particularly interesting due 
to the distinctive discourse found within the government-affiliated media. 
Analysis of the government press – the newspapers Erkintoo and Kyrgyz 
Tuusu (in Kyrgyz) and Vechernyi Bishkek (in Russian) – has indicated a 
coherent discourse regarding the elections, the likelihood of a revolution 
and, consequently, the risk to political stability.  
It is hard to establish the exact agent responsible for generating the 
discourse. What is clear is that the government-affiliated press picked up on, 
and constantly elaborated on, the main themes of speeches made by the then-
president. The government formulated and communicated certain messages 
through the government-affiliated press in the run-up to, and during, the 
elections. These included notions that the ‘colourful revolutions’ in Georgia 
and the Ukraine had brought political and economic instability in these 
countries, and that this would also threaten ‘peaceful’ Kyrgyzstan; and the 
idea that these revolutions had not come from the grassroots level, but had 
been ‘organised and financed by outside forces’, which had thereby de-
stabilised the political situation. These ‘outside forces’ were identified as the 
National Democratic Institute, the (US-based) Soros Foundation, USAID, 
and the US State Department. The OSCE and the remaining international 
observers were also put in this category. Additionally, the newly introduced 
exit polls were seen as part of the strategy of the ‘foreign de-stabilisers’. 
The government discourse surrounding the elections contributed to a 
highly politicised atmosphere. The government press constructed discursive 
categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and election observers received different labels 
on the basis of this scheme. Whereas observers from CIS countries were 
accorded considerable attention in the government press and were regarded 
as ‘independent, objective and highly respected observers’, the OSCE 
missions, along with other Western observers, were seen as supporters of the 
‘outside forces’ who were seeking to de-stabilise the political situation. 
They, it was said, were looking only for violations committed by the 
government side, while ignoring the violations of the opposition.  
 Methods  
 
The findings presented in this article are based on an extensive review of the 
pro-government press in the Kyrgyz and Russian languages. This is not a 
media review in the standard sense of the term, which assumes the media to 
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be free and representative of the wider public view. In this work, I look at 
the press outlets through which the former government ‘talked’ directly to 
the public. Thus, this is an analysis of the former government’s discourse as 
presented through the press in Kyrgyzstan.  
I have examined issues of Kyrgyz Tuusu, Erkintoo and Vechernyi Bishkek 
from late December 2004 until mid-March 2005. Erkintoo and Kyrgyz 
Tuusu are circulated nationwide at subsidised prices. Vechernyi Bishkek is 
a daily newspaper; Kyrgyz Tuusu and Erkintoo appear twice a week. The 
latter two previously provided extensive coverage of government activities, 
including the texts of new laws and presidential decrees. The former 
paper is known for a more intellectual analysis of Kyrgyz politics. 
Kyrgyz Tuusu and Erkintoo were formally government-recognised 
newspapers. Vechernyi Bishkek was the most widely read newspaper in the 
capital; although it was not formally affiliated with the government, the 
public realised that this newspaper was on the side of the government – not 
least since it was believed that the son of the former president was the owner.  
Due to subsidies from the former government, these newspapers were the 
most read, and the most widely distributed. In the case of Vechernyi Bishkek, 
this was also due to good financing, raised by the advertisements and 
commercials section in the paper, many of which were government 
affiliated. In remote villages and regions, only government newspapers 
would be delivered. In fact, they were even given instead of change, or 
together with, pensions and other forms of welfare payment. This contrasted 
with the opposition outlets, which could not be spread throughout the 
country but were confined to the capital and other oblast centres. 
 
2. Defining Discourse 
 
 Defining Discourse Management 
 
This analysis draws on the concepts of ‘discourse’ and a ‘discourse of 
danger’.  
 Defining discourse management  
 
Strategies, as well as the control of the flow and direction of messages, choice of 
topics and techniques of guiding discussions in order to influence outcomes. 
(Isen, 2003: 2) 
 
Discourse is not a sum total of semantics or rhetoric. It goes above and 
beyond the use of language and symbols, beyond messages never uttered but 
still communicated implicitly, or concealed in utterances. 
Discourse management is partly a process of setting public agendas. 
Additionally, it determines the limits and flow of messages, monitoring their 
sources, their impacts, and limiting or remedying their damage. It also 
incorporates the choice of particular arrays of means, modes and media of 
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debate, selecting types which are conducive to the creation of favourable 
mindsets, ways of seeing, thinking, doing and being in the world.  
 
 A Method of Exploiting ‘Identity’ 
 
David Campbell (1992: 70), writing within critical security studies, similarly 
puts forward two important arguments that are of relevance here. The first is 
the post-structuralist argument which holds that meaning is constituted in 
‘difference’, and that, when logic operates within this difference, it has the 
potential to transform into a hostile ‘otherness’. This means that the political 
identity of a state is created by continual practices of demarcating the self 
from the other, those inside the state from those outside, and the domestic 
from the foreign.  
Critical security studies are not only concerned with the representation of 
‘danger’ as abstract a notion. They also draw attention to the fact that the 
successful identification of a threat can allow a state to use extraordinary 
measures of control over its own population. As Rawnsley and Rawnsley 
argue, ‘threats from an external power are used more often to secure internal 
benefits than external security’ (2001; cited in Megoran, 2005: 7). Whereas 
realism takes the state as a given entity and asks, ‘how can it be secured?’ 
critical security studies take ‘discourses of insecurity’ or ‘representations of 
danger’ and ask, ‘what do they do, how do they work, and for 
whom?’(Weldes et al., 1999, cited in Megoran 2005: 7). In other words, a 
discourse of danger is created not only to identify threats and destroy them, 
but also to use the image of that threat and danger in order to promote certain 
interests.  
 
3. Discourse Around ‘Political Instability’ 
 
 Utilising the ‘War on Terror’ 
 
Prior to the parliamentary elections in February 2005, the Akaev government 
arguably created a discourse of danger and instability. In this discourse, the 
key threat was the potential for chaos in the situation of a ‘revolution’ 
generated by outside forces. The government-affiliated press identified the 
‘crisis’ of the ‘velvet revolution’ in Georgia as being a threat to the national 
security of Kyrgyzstan, and linked that revolution to ‘external factors’ 
(Akaev, 2004: 6). This resonates with Campbell’s notion that foreign policy 
and foreign issues have implications for domestic politics and for the 
formation of identities. The foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan, joining in with the 
coalition against terrorism, while contributing to the international war on 
terror, played a significant role in identifying dangers at home. Moreover, it 
moved the global rhetoric on ‘terrorism’ to Kyrgyzstan. The notion that the 
majority of the countries in the world are engaged in a ‘war on terrorism’ has 
become embedded in the thinking of the people of Kyrgyzstan, and most 
accept the phrase without question. This was the government line before the 
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2005 elections. However, while that government further developed its 
policies against terrorism at home, the concept was also used as a tool to de-
legitimise the opposition, by labelling them ‘terrorists’. All the same, during 
the election period the former government positioned itself against the 
‘West’.  
 
 Government strategies  
 
Let us now look into the following questions: 
 
• Based on these ‘threats’, how did the Akaev government set the 
agenda for the government policies, and how did this government 
formulate the framework for the perception and analysis of such 
threats?  
• How did the Akaev government determine the limit and flow of 
messages and monitor their impacts? 
• How did the Akaev government, rather than protecting the 
population from ‘objective danger’, frame its domestic politics so 
as to create a powerful authority with the ability to ‘describe’ the 
present dangers?  
 
 Central Themes  
 
From my analysis of Kyrgyz Tuusu and Erkintoo between late December and 
mid-March, two themes emerge as dominant: ‘velvet revolutions’ and ‘clean 
Kyrgyzstan’. Both can be seen as forming part of this danger discourse.  
The ‘velvet revolutions’ were presented as being a danger to the political 
stability held to exist in Kyrgyzstan under the leadership of Askar Akaev. 
The press portrayed the political stability in Kyrgyzstan as an achievement, 
presented in juxtaposition to the civil war in Tajikistan, the Afghanistan 
tragedy and the escalation of the 1990 Osh events. The country was 
prospering, due to independence, international recognition and the rule of 
law. And now its very stability was presented as being under threat from 
‘tulip revolutions’ bound to lead to civil war, bloodshed and instability. The 
following quote, from an article written before the elections, is indicative:  
 
We remember how the Osh events divided us and our youth, and I hope very 
much that those who are organising meetings and pickets will not involve our 
children. Who can guarantee that there will be no ‘small’ wars and no bloodshed 
during a ‘tulip’ revolution? Thanks to the bright leadership by our president, we 
were saved from the development of the Osh events in the Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan tragedies. We have seen what it is like to be in war, and it is for this 
reason that we do not wish anything like this for independent and prosperous 
Kyrgyzstan.29 
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 ‘Joogazyn revolutsiasynyn ozgocholuu kesepetteri’, Erkintoo 18 February 2005, p. 9 
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The velvet revolutions were also labelled as being dangerous when seen 
as part of an ideological extremism. In seeking to understand this discourse, 
we may well ask, what is real and what is created? It is a fact that people 
were setting governmental buildings on fire, that there were attacks on 
governmental bodies, massive marches were blocking highways, there were 
hunger strikes, threats of people setting fire to themselves, and 
demonstration murders. This is what happened in factual terms. In a different 
setting or from a different point of view, however, demonstration murders 
and attacks on governmental bodies would be referred to as crimes, and 
massive marches and the blocking of highways would be seen as political 
participation. The government-affiliated press was politicising the events, 
referring to a kind of ideological extremism which threatened the political 
stability in the country, because these actions were supported by ‘some 
political organisations’ and they ignored the law.30   
 
 De-legitimising Terminology 
 
The use of the terms ‘ideological extremism’, ‘terrorism’, ‘political 
extremism’ and ‘ideological radicalism’ was intended to de-legitimise the 
opposition, who were engaged in demonstrations and velvet revolution. This 
de-legitimisation was done by creating a rhetorical link between the 
opposition and banned terrorist organisations such as ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir’ and 
‘IMU’. In his speech to the National Security Council, ‘On Measures 
Strengthening the Fight against Extremism and Terrorism’, Akaev identified 
four types of extremism: terrorism, religious radicalism, ethnic and political 
extremism. According to him, almost all of them were to be found in 
Kyrgyzstan. Along with the Hizb-ut-Tahrir terrorism, he said that there were 
growing tendencies towards extremism, developed through ‘demonstration 
murders, fires and attacks against governmental bodies’. The main 
characteristic of these crimes was that they had the objective of de-
stabilising the situation in the country. Furthermore, he identified 
‘radicalism, through acts that ignore law, in the form of massive highway 
blocking, protesting acts, hunger strikes etc’.  
According to Akaev, there was a new and especially threatening 
phenomenon, which he called ‘ideological terrorism’. This was characterised 
by ‘ignorance of the law and the state’ and was an ‘ideological attack against 
public order and security’. There were two forms of ideological terrorism: 
one of which involved Hizb-ut-Tahrir and its alleged overseas supporters, 
so-called human rights fighters. The second form was the ‘aggressive 
circulation (by certain groups, organisations and media involved in the 
political fight) of their understanding of the country’s development, social 
justice, democracy, freedom of speech and demonstrations, which is 
projected onto the society’. According to Akaev, it was not only the ‘internal 
forces’ (the opposition) that were revolutionary, but also the religious 
organisation ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir’. For this reason, this organisation was also 
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seen as a threat to Kyrgyzstan’s national security and political stability, as it 
had a single aim of seizing power.  
 
4. Discourse Around ‘Outside Forces’ 
 
 The Threat of ‘Neo-Colonialisation’ 
 
In addition to the threats of terrorism and extremism associated with the 
velvet revolutions was the threat of becoming a neo-colony in the 21st 
century. Kyrgyz Tuusu and Erkintoo published articles that explained what 
these ‘colour revolutions’ were, where they came from and who was behind 
them. According to them, the danger came from ‘external aid’ or ‘external 
powers’ (vneshnie sily in Russian, syrtky kuchtor in Kyrgyz). The colour 
revolutions had started in Serbia, Georgia, and the Ukraine; now they were 
threatening to come to Kyrgyzstan.  
According to an article published in December, ‘the scenario was worked 
out by the USA ambassador, first in Serbia, and, at the time, each 
ambassador was trying to implement it in his or her country. The USA was 
funding the preparations for such revolutions, directly or indirectly, through 
NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute, the International 
Republican Institute, the Carnegie Fund, and the Open Society Institute. For 
this reason, the Kyrgyz state was forced to ask whether Mr. [Stephen] 
Young, the US ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, was a diplomat, or an 
instructor who was interfering in the domestic affairs of the country and 
exceeding his competence.’31  
Previously, all of these organisations had been welcomed, respected and 
recognised by Akaev. His government had quoted these organisations and 
referred to them as reliable institutions. However, due to the special political 
situation created by the parliamentary elections, as well as the events in the 
world regarding velvet revolutions, the government changed its rhetoric. 
Akaev’s government denied the fact that the people demonstrating on the 
streets were just ordinary people, and instead presented them as ‘agents of 
the external forces’ who got paid by the hour and were provided with food 
and places to sleep, as had been the case in the Ukraine. If a ‘velvet 
revolution’ did occur, then it would mean that Kyrgyzstan had been demoted 
to the status of a neo-colony of the ‘West’ and its money. The newspapers 
blamed Ukraine’s former opposition for what was seen as the present 
‘misfortunes’ of that country (Oppositisia Ukrainanyn ubalyna kaldy, 
Ukrainanyn koz jashy) and stated that Ukraine was on the brink of a 
dangerous civil war.  
 
 Externalising the Internal 
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In de-legitimising the idea of a velvet revolution, the government 
externalised internal opponents. The grievances and proposals of the 
opponents, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the opposition, were never reasonably 
examined or explained.32 This strategy externalised the opponents because, 
rather than being indigenous proponents of alternative forms of government, 
the threats to Kyrgyzstan were portrayed as external. Akaev spoke darkly of 
the ‘outside forces’, branding those citizens of Kyrgyzstan who joined them 
as traitors who were selling their dignity, their motherland, their stability and 
the unity of the nation for money. The labelled external forces were the 
National Democratic Institute, the Open Society Institute and the Soros 
Foundation Kyrgyzstan. Even though the opposition, which supported the 
idea of a velvet revolution, was local and indigenous, it too was dismissed as 
being external. 
 
5. ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ 
 
‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ was a long-term modernisation strategy, declared by 
then-President Askar Akaev on 5 February 2005 at the 5th Kurultai of the 
People of Kyrgyzstan. From that point until mid-March, the official 
government newspapers, Kyrgyz Tuusu and Erkintoo allocated a page or two 
to the topic of ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’, under the rubrics ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan, 
You and Me,’ and ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’.  
Akaev identified five branches of his new ideology: clean water, clean 
elections, clean technology, clean nature and clean hands. The purpose of 
the programme was to renew and cleanse the country, and to develop the 
economy. The five branches of the president’s programme were directed: 
 
• against corruption (clean hands);  
• towards the development of water resource management (clean 
water); 
• towards the development of an information era (clean 
technology); 
• towards the protection of nature (clean nature);  
• towards conducting fair and free elections (clean elections). 
 
  Central Themes 
 
The discussions on the pages of these newspapers went beyond simply 
restating Akaev’s new programme. It is appropriate to analyse these themes 
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in terms of conventional and classic categories, such as economic, social and 
political stability, and national purity (or solidarity). Using Campbell’s 
(1992) self/other dichotomisation, where boundaries are enacted 
discursively, the analysis will also be considered in terms of dichotomies 
such as economic stability versus instability.  
 
 ‘Clean’ versus ‘Dirty’ 
 
Once again, demonstrations and ‘velvet revolutions’ were presented as the 
work of the ‘internal forces’ serving as the catalysis of the external threat. 
This was done under the pretext of fighting for human rights and freedoms. 
Velvet revolution threatened the democracy of the Kyrgyz people, it was 
claimed. Similarly, the theme of ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ referred to political 
stability by presenting ‘dirty’ politicians as a threat. The underlying idea was 
that only ‘clean’ governors could guarantee political stability in the country. 
This political stability was now under threat, because the politicians 
promoting a velvet revolution were ‘dirty’. The following is a quote from an 
article published one week before the election. 
 
A bad politician is ‘koomdun kolkosuna chykkan jara’ (a disease of the whole 
society), and therefore in order to take care of the health of our fatherland, it is 
our responsibility to cure these ‘ill’ people by ‘explaining’ to them. The idea 
behind Clean Kyrgyzstan is that it proves, time and again, the holiness of our 
fatherland, and that nobody should touch it with dirty hands. Cleanness is a 
slogan of our holy Ala-Too. Our buildings, for the sake of our people and the 
future generations of the country, should be able to withstand earthquakes, 
should have clean internal ecology, and should be politically and seismically 
stable and strong. Certainly, no country has the right to intervene, from the 
outside, in our country-building. However, we need to punish and ‘explain’ this 
to the ‘internal strangers’ who want our buildings to be vulnerable to 
earthquakes.33  
 
Here we note the analogy between the destructive force of earthquakes 
and the ‘threat from internal strangers’.  
 
 Harmony 
 
Another dominant theme was that of harmony. This also touched on political 
stability and stressed the importance of Akaev’s leadership for the unity of 
the Kyrgyz people. According to the newspapers, Kyrgyzstan was stable 
politically because it was under a strong leadership. The Mufti of 
Kyrgyzstan was quoted as saying that the president was ‘the shadow of 
Allah on Earth’. 
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 It was Akaev who led Kyrgyzstan after the chaos of the USSR collapse, when 
the Kyrgyz people did not know where to head and what to do. When Akaev is 
the captain of the White ship, which is being overcome by tsunamis, people do 
not worry about anything. They are wealthy with peace and prosperity!34  
 
This political stability was threatened when people questioned the power 
of the leader and ‘hated’ the president. To hate the president meant to hate 
the people, it was argued. Only ‘ary joktor oz Ajosyn koralbait’, which 
translates as ‘only the stupid can hate their own Ajo’ (the historical title for 
the head of Khanate).  
The theme of harmony was used in order to defend the value of political 
stability over any other issue. Proverbs like ‘Bekter ketet el kalat, betege 
ketet bel kalat’ (grasses are not eternal, but the mountain is, leaders come 
and go, but people stay), and ‘eki too kagylyshsa, ortosunda mal olot’ (if two 
mountains crash, cattle die between them) gave the message that it is not 
worth sacrificing the harmony of the whole nation for politics. Furthermore, 
it stressed that innocent people should not be made victims of two fighting 
forces. From an article written right after the second round of the elections: 
 
 Ancient, holy Kyrgyz people have always overcome any challenge with wisdom, 
national unity and harmony. The source and power of happiness is always found 
in harmony.35 
 
The Kyrgyz proverb, ‘Aiyldyn iti ala bolso da, boru korso chogulat’ 
(though dogs of a village are not united, they unite against wolves), was used 
to invoke the notion that the opposition and the government should unite for 
the holy motherland. Prior to the elections, the newspapers presented this 
social stability as inter-ethnic, inter-religious peace and stability. However, 
according to Akaev, the ‘yellow plague’ of the colourful revolutions was 
threatening the healthy Kyrgyzstan society. Everybody was aware of what a 
plague was for humanity: 
 
 Our people will not allow the ‘yellow plague’ to enter our land and there is no 
reason for such disease. The western reactionary forces are greedy and evil. We 
need to understand that this type of politics will enslave us. Why should we sell 
our national interests and freedom for evil money? 
 
 We have seen with our own eyes how the ‘West’ smartly used the religious 
factor to destroy the people of Yugoslavia. It is obvious that the leaders of the 
colourful revolution will not treat the ‘colonised’ country well. They are 
spreading the poison of slavery onto our people, but our people have always 
been free and will never let it happen.36 
 
                                                     
34
   ‘Ary joktor oz Ajosyn koralbait’, Erkintoo 25 February 2005, p. 3 
35
   ‘Ata jurttun birimdigi yiyk’, Kyrgyz Tuusu, 11–14 March 2005 p. 9 
36
   ‘Elibiz ‘sary chumaga’ jol berbeit’, Kyrgyz Tuusu 18–20, 21–27, 27–31 January 2005, 4–
7 February 2005 
Anara Karagulova 32 
 Expanding the Mankurt Myth 
 
The velvet revolution was also portrayed as threatening the social stability 
by appearing as a mankurt. The Kyrgyz writer Chyngyz Aitmatov used the 
mankurt as a character in his novel, One Day Lasts Longer Than a Century 
(1988), which is well known among the Kyrgyz people. It is a legend about a 
bird that sang differently. During the invasion of Chyngyzkhan, a tribe called 
Naiman was enslaved. The Mongols tortured the captives and turned them 
into working ‘machines’. They ‘deleted’ the memory of men by putting a hot 
camel’s stomach on their head, which would then squeeze the head as it 
dried. The only son of a Naiman mother becomes one such slave. In the 
story, he shoots his mother when she comes looking for him. He is called 
‘Mankurt’ because he lost his memory, he lost his identity and he killed his 
mother. This word is used widely to indicate someone who is faithless and 
who has forgotten his history. In the current situation, the danger of a 
revolution conducted by the USA was exaggerated so that it appeared as 
though that country wanted to enslave the Kyrgyz people and turn them into 
mankurts. 
 
In early February, Kyrgyz Tuusu wrote that some forces wanted to turn 
the people into mankurts. It made references to certain groups that were 
supported by outside forces and planning to make a ‘tulip’ revolution.  
 
Imposing somebody’s will on others is a violation of sovereignty. In a wider 
sense, it is a method of turning people into mankurts. By imposing their own 
ideas on the people, and deciding the results of the elections, outside forces are 
introducing, on a large scale, the creation of mankurts.37 
 
The themes of clean Kyrgyzstan, velvet revolution and harmony appeal 
to the new national ideology were worked out after independence, around 
the ideas of the unifying theme of the legendary Kyrgyz hero Manas. One of 
the seven principles of Manas was national unity and the Great Kyrgyz 
Empire, the ancient Kyrgyz statehood.  
 
 ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ and National Identity 
 ‘Our’ Purity 
 
The theme of ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ appealed to the idea of national purity by 
painting a picture of ‘clear and innocent us’ as the only ones entitled to carry 
out the new programme. A prosperous future and clear ideas were presented 
as being the future results of this new programme. One article written before 
the elections asserted that the Kyrgyz nation needed this new approach in 
order to impede those who wanted ‘dirty money’.  
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In order to facilitate the new programme, one already needs to have ‘taza iyman’ 
(clean intentions/sense). If a person is clean then everything will be clean. 
Everything good starts from cleanness. Everybody who lives for the motherland, 
whose heart beats for our country, must contribute to this ‘holy’ beginning and 
must support the great idea of our Ajo. 
 
The word ak (literally: white) has multiple meanings and connotations, 
among them: innocence, cleanness, good, milk products (thus food), and the 
colour white. To gain legitimacy and support, the government appealed to 
ancestral support for the idea of Clean Kyrgyzstan: 
 
 Cleanness is sacred for the nomad Kyrgyz people, and white snow will clean evil 
intentions, sinful hearts, and dirty minds. Cleanliness is a great word, cleanness 
is a tradition for the generation of the Khan Manas. Kyrgyz people are always on 
the tops of mountains and will never bend. Kyrgyz people will not be sold for a 
‘dollar witch’.38 She is coming to life and is swallowing the whole world. 
Beware of this witch and be clean. If the Kyrgyz people had not been clean since 
ancient times, they would not have lived to this date and would not have white 
hats on their heads.39  
 
 Presidential Purity 
 
Alongside the idea of ‘Clean Kyrgyzstan’ a discourse evolved around the 
legitimacy of President Askar Akaev’s rule. His image was ‘clean’, 
‘innocent’ and ‘blessed by Manas’, to lead Kyrgyzstan on a new, ‘clean’ 
path. Happy and independent Kyrgyzstan was acknowledged to be an island 
of democracy under the leadership of Askar Akaev, but it still needed to 
clean itself from the dirt of colourful revolutions, the power of the ‘dollar 
witch’ and traitors. The legitimisation of Akaev’s rule was presented within 
the framework of this theme by portraying him as a ‘clean’ person.40 Only a 
clean person with clean hands and clean thoughts can propose a programme 
of Clean Kyrgyzstan – an unclean person cannot push through such a 
historical achievement. The Mufti of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan, Murataly ajy 
Jumanov, stated: ‘the King is the shadow of God on Earth. Whoever respects 
the King, respects God.’41 God is clean and likes cleanliness. The president 
of the country is on God’s path. Akaev’s good reputation is also promoted 
(whilst his unpopularity among the people is ignored) because ‘bad persons 
are not capable of valuing true wealth’. According to one article in Kyrgyz 
Tuusu: ‘Asyl barkyn asyl gana tushunot’ – only good people can understand 
good, so only intelligent and smart people can define Ajo’s rating. Certainly 
the programme ‘Clean Elections’ had the implication of electing only those 
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who were ‘clean’ to rule the country. Clean hands are assumed to prevent 
corruption and to select those who are ‘clean and loyal’ to stay in power.  
 
6. Election Observers and Exit Polls 
 
The government’s pre-election line about the presence of foreign election 
observers, and about the exit polls, can be observed in the government-
affiliated Vecherniy Bishkek.  
 
 
 
 Exit Polls 
 
In the context of the pre-election atmosphere (combined with the discourse 
of danger from ‘colour revolutions’), exit polls were regarded as ‘another 
tool’ of the outside forces in influencing the elections results. Articles 
published in Vechernyi Bishkek, such as ‘Exit Polls. Checking whom?’ and 
‘Why are Exit Polls Dangerous?’ talk about exit polls as a ‘technology of 
pressure’ and ‘technology of filth’. Referring to the history of exit polls in 
the USA in the 1980s, and their recent failure during the last two presidential 
elections in the USA, such polls are defined as ‘manipulative’. According to 
Vechernyi Bishkek, exit polls were used extensively during the ‘colour 
revolutions’ in the CIS countries to ‘create the general public idea that a 
national movement had won the election, and thus, when the Central 
Electoral Committee announced the results, street forces were mobilised, 
demanding the announcement of the true results’. They were presented as a 
service, with a ‘customer’ and ‘executor’: the ‘customers’ during the 
‘revolutions’ were the US State Department, USAID, the RAND 
Corporation and the NATO Centre for Information and Documentation. 
With the help of exit polls the ‘mechanism of manipulating the electorate 
opinion’ is very easy, wrote Vechernyi Bishkek . The results of the survey are 
regularly given to the Western media. After the closure of the polling 
stations, the ‘parallel counting of votes’ starts. The results of the ‘parallel 
canvass’ match the ‘necessary data’ and, from the very beginning, contradict 
the results of the district electoral commission, ‘creating the illusion of 
falsified elections results’. Furthermore, it takes only a technique to bring the 
masses to streets and storm administrative buildings. The main function of 
exit polls is to ‘fulfil the order of the customer’.42  
 
The Central Electoral Committee (CEC) also expressed its opinion, 
through the press, concerning exit polls right after the Election Day. The 
official line of the CEC was that the ‘parallel canvass’ could be used to 
intentionally discredit the elections results. Moreover, it was emphasised that 
exit polls did not have legal force, and that the survey results were 
unreliable, since they could assert totally different results, based on a  
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sample of only 10 people. Therefore, exit poll results should not be released 
before the official results are made public.43  
 
 Election Observers 
 Reports and Reactions 
 
A line of discourse was also created around the observers, dividing them into 
two groups and presenting them in certain shades. Observers from the CIS 
countries were regarded as ‘our people’, whereas the Western observers, 
including the OSCE mission, were referred to as ‘them’. A positive tone 
regarding the CIS observers was expressed throughout the many interviews 
and articles focusing on CIS Chairman Vladimir Rushailo and the deputy 
chairman of the executive committee of the CIS, Asan Kozhakov. 
Representatives of the CIS observers reported that the polling stations had 
been well prepared. Concerning election constituencies, CIS observers 
pointed out that they met the Kyrgyz Republic Elections Code requirements. 
The co-operation between the CIS observers and the local authorities (the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Electoral Committee) was also 
highlighted. Moreover, the CIS observers allegedly did not find any 
‘violations’ during the pre-election period. Even if there had been some 
minor violations, it was stressed that these had been dealt with by legislative 
means and through appropriate judicial organs. Moreover, these 
irregularities, according to CIS delegation, were not great; they did not 
prevent people from voting freely and did not affect the poll results. CIS  
observers also emphasised the serious measures taken ‘legally and 
legitimately’ by the government in order to guarantee free and fair 
democratic elections, and to guarantee the fundamental rights of the citizens 
to elect and be elected. More than 100 independent observers from the CIS 
countries, under the leadership of the deputy chairman of the executive 
committee of CIS, had been welcomed to observe elections, and, they 
affirmed, the government had shown deep respect and trust towards the 
objectivity of these observers.  
The articles concerning the OSCE and other Western observers, both 
prior to and after the elections, underlined the ‘readiness’ of the government 
to do everything necessary to permit free and fair elections. ‘The first vice 
minister of foreign affairs, Talant Kushchubekov, noted our government’s 
firm adherence to conducting fair and transparent elections’. It can be 
concluded that this was the reason why the government was co-operating 
with Western observers, and organising a series of round table meetings 
together with the OSCE mission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Newspaper coverage after the election on 27 February focused on the 
findings of the CIS observers. Several articles were published, with 
interviews and quotes from the CIS observers from various press 
conferences and briefings. Accented and emphasised were the reports of the 
CIS observers that noted the ‘free and fair’ conducted elections, the high 
level of organisation and legality of the pre-elections campaign, and the open 
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expression of the people’s will. They hailed the elections as well organised, 
free, and fair. The CIS observers also praised the local authorities for 
showing restraint and competence in dealing with the political unrest in 
several regions. Moreover, the press coverage referred to as many sources as 
possible with regard to the ‘independence and objectivity’ of the 
parliamentary elections. One of these sources was the London International 
Democratic Institute observers’ mission (LIDI),44 which stressed the 
success, professionalism and independence of the election process. LIDI also 
noted the high voter turn-out. According to LIDI, ‘some violations that were 
reported are only technical and cannot anyhow cast a shadow on the general 
electoral process.’45 In several ‘positive remarks’ concerning the legitimate, 
free and fair elections from CIS observers, the press coverage quoted 
independent observers from Russia, China and representatives of local 
observers (the Public Council for Democratic Security, the chairman of the 
executive committee of CIS, the deputy chairman of the same institution and 
the London International Democratic Institute). Li Hua, from the Chinese 
delegation of international observers, found the elections to be transparent 
and fair, and gave a high evaluation of the work of Kyrgyz government in 
creating the conditions to enable elections to be conducted in a peaceful and 
calm atmosphere. Here we can trace the continuation of the discourse 
surrounding the importance of political stability and peacefulness for the 
people of Kyrgyzstan that had been present in the previous cases of Clean 
Kyrgyzstan and the national unity ideology.  
The press emphasised a statement made by chairman of the CIS 
executive committee Asan Kozhakov, that observers from the CIS had 
carried out their duties under the principles of political neutrality, 
impartiality and non-interference into electoral process.46 Among the 
‘violations’ noted by the CIS observers were the ‘pushy and even aggressive 
behaviour by some experts developing exit polls’, the ‘long lines due to 
thumb markings’, the ‘inappropriate behaviour of the candidates’ and some 
‘other technical, not particularly serious violations’.47 The CIS delegations 
opined that the practice of marking the voter’s thumbnails with inedible ink 
slowed down the voting process, but the general conclusion was that there 
had been ‘free and fair elections in accordance with international standards’.  
A former pro-governmental politician, Toktayim Umetalieva, published 
an article just prior to the elections, in which the practice of marking voter’s 
thumbnails was judged as the ‘interference of the West’ and that it ‘treated 
the Kyrgyz people like cattle’. In the words of Umetalieva, the revolution in 
Ukraine took place because the ‘people of Ukraine were annoyed by the 
clear interference of a foreign country (Russia) in their domestic affairs, not 
because Yukoshenko was pro-Western’. Umetalieva went on: 
 
Yanukovich allowed himself to be presented as a slave waiting for the command 
of his lord. For this reason, this example should be a lesson for the so-called 
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‘home-grown’ opposition in Kyrgyzstan. The opposition was living on Western 
grants alone, and was grown by NDI and Freedom House. The only analogy 
between the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was the pressure coming from outside and 
nothing more. The ambassador of the USA was himself inspecting our polling 
stations. The so-called opposition betrayed the national interests of our country 
and allowed us to be humiliated. Our voters will be ‘marked’ to the American 
money, as cattle are to pasture, or as a drug addict is to a filthy club. The author 
of this idea was a diplomat from the US. Our people are literate and know where 
to sign on the ballot. There are things which are much more important than 
electoral procedures and formality reporting. These are the interests of our 
country. We need to say that we respect our neighbours, we respect ‘Vesti’ and 
NDI, but we will live our own life and decide the politics of Kyrgyzstan in 
Bishkek, not in Washington. There is no need to conduct the elections under the 
dictation of the West. There is nothing to elect on these elections. Moreover, the 
money for the marking procedure was provided by the OSCE in Georgia.48  
 
 The OSCE Mission  
 
There was a noticeable absence of quotes from the OSCE representatives in 
the press coverage of the observer reports issued just after the election. The 
OSCE mission was generally mentioned indirectly, as a participant at round 
table meetings organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (where reports 
stressed how the representatives of the MFA assessed the elections to be 
open, transparent and in accordance with international standards).49 This 
created the impression that the OSCE mission agreed with such statements 
by virtue of their participation at these governmental round tables. Even 
though the press mentioned the name OSCE very often, only a single article 
in Vechernyi Bishkek was devoted to covering the views set forth in the 
OSCE mission report. Thus, press coverage effectively put the violations 
that OSCE had observed in secondary place, mentioning them only briefly, 
in only a sentence or two. This single article concerning the OSCE report 
was titled ‘OSCE Approves the Elections’50 – despite the fact that Kimmo 
Kiljunen, head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation, had been 
critical to the elections and pointed out various shortcomings. According to 
the Vechernyi Bishkek article: ‘The election displayed some improvements, 
including the fact that voters were offered a real choice among the contesting 
candidates in many constituencies.’ By contrast, the following critique 
offered by the OSCE observers regarding the elections was published on the 
Internet and in other non-governmental media: 
 
 However, the competitive dynamic was undermined, throughout the country, by 
the de-registration of candidates, interference with the independent media, vote 
buying, and a low level of confidence in the electoral and judicial institutions on 
the part of candidates and voters. The shortcomings during the election campaign 
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  ‘V sootvetstvii s normami’, Vechernyi Bishkek 9 March 2005 
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affected the overall conduct of the elections. The interpretations of the Election 
Code were at times controversial and particularly restrictive. The de-registration 
of candidates was inconsistent, resulting in several protests by opposition 
supporters.  
 
Furthermore, the government press made no mention of the fact that 
Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj (who headed the OSCE long-term mission) had 
urged the Kyrgyz authorities to rectify some of the shortcomings in time for 
the second round of the elections. ‘We appeal [to the authorities] not to 
revoke the registration of candidates for unsubstantial reasons, to refrain 
from interfering with the work of the mass media, and to refrain from 
making provocative statements, accusing the opposition of having 
connections with extremism’, Kopaj said. ‘All of these steps can be 
undertaken immediately and they can improve the second round to a great 
extent.’ 
One article by an alleged expert, Viachislav Smirnov (published in 
Vechernyi Bishkek with his name given ‘expert’, but it did not specify why 
this was so), between the two rounds of the elections, talked about the 
‘revolution’ that was supposed to occur during the parliamentary elections.51 
Stressing the geopolitical uniqueness of Kyrgyzstan, the author wrote that 
‘outside forces’ could not create a revolution situation like that of Ukraine 
and Georgia, due to the ‘laziness’ of the opposition and the ‘wisdom’ of the 
people. According to this article, the parliamentary elections were of such 
interest to the West that as many as 700 ‘troops of OSCE observers landed’ 
in Kyrgyzstan for the Election Day. Smirnov criticised the OSCE observers’ 
outrage at the fact that the president had compared the appeals to an ‘orange 
revolution’, and discarded the remarks of the OSCE observers as the ‘usual 
rubbish’.  
The same article noted that the elections were free and fair, and that the 
government had fulfilled its duty by cancelling the registration candidates’ 
for reasons of bribery. Smirnov stresses that the Western observers did not 
‘see’ the collection of violations from other candidates (including ‘colourful’ 
candidates) because ‘they only need violations from the government’. It is 
suggested that the international observers simply cannot understand that one 
can bribe a whole village with a table full of food for five hundred people, 
with meat, bread and green tea. Moreover, observers should exhibit 
‘responsibility’ and not give in to ‘destructive elements’ that could justify 
unlawful acts. Western ‘revolution technologies’ cannot be implemented in 
Central Asia. If Ukraine considers itself to be part of Europe, and 
Moldavians want to be ‘almost Romanians’, then ‘Asia is Asia’, with a 
totally different logic and way of thinking. Western ‘revolution production 
engineers’ want a precedent in Asia and they deeply want to prove that 
‘velvet revolutions’ are possible in the Muslim world. If they can 
demonstrate that these are possible, then the US Congress will really pour 
‘golden rain’ onto the ‘revolution production engineers’. Yet, it is to be 
hoped that the American people understand that ‘orange matches’ in the 
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hands of local ‘liberals’ can cause ‘green fire’ which cannot be stopped even 
with the united efforts of the USA and Russia.52  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Long before the parliamentary elections were scheduled for 27 February 
2005, it had become clear to the observers of Kyrgyzstan’s political 
processes that this parliamentary election had the potential to change the 
course of the country. Such expectations certainly sharpened preparations for 
the forthcoming elections, on the part of the former government and Akaev. 
The closer the election date came, the clearer was Akaev’s rhetoric on his 
position towards the West and ‘producers of the revolution’. In the pre-
elections period the government actively tried to set the agenda. The findings 
illustrated above through a review of the government-affiliated press show 
that election observation took place in a highly politicised setting due to the 
discourse created by the government.  
The discourse in the government press tried to appeal to national unity 
through the heroic-historical ‘Manas’ ideology; the press tried to create an 
image of ‘danger’ coming from ‘destructive outside forces’ and mobilising 
the ‘internal betrayers’ (seen as threatening political stability, unity, 
cleanliness, democracy and clean elections). According to this discourse, 
national unity and political stability could be maintained only under the 
leadership of a ‘clean person’. This legitimised Akaev as the ‘blessed’ leader 
of the Kyrgyz people, who had saved the country from the bloodshed that 
had taken place in Tajikistan and in Afghanistan. ‘Colour revolutions’ were 
further equated to natural catastrophes like earthquakes and tsunamis, from 
which Kyrgyzstan was saved due to its ‘cleanliness’ from ‘dirty Western 
money’. This discourse management employed the technique of drawing a 
line between ‘self’ and ‘other’, with the Western group of election observers 
categorised into the ‘Other’ (‘them’) camp, while the CIS delegation was 
placed within the ‘self’ group, and its findings and reports were extensively 
covered by the government press. The OSCE mission was associated with 
the list of ‘outside forces’, such as the National Democratic Institute, Open 
Society Institute, USAID, US State Department and Carnegie Fund. Exit 
polls were also branded as an attempt to ‘discredit’ the official election 
results of the Central Electoral Committee.  
Certainly, any election is a political event that takes place under tense 
conditions. There will always be winners and losers. Nevertheless, the 
discourse used by the government of Kyrgyzstan in order to de-legitimise the 
opposition and influence the public opinion created several difficulties for 
election observers. The impartiality, independence and objectivity of the 
observers were questioned. Being associated with the ‘West’ and ‘Western 
outside forces’, the OSCE mission was expected to take the side of the 
opposition. That also meant that the Kyrgyz opposition also placed high 
hopes in the Western observers: they were expected to reveal violations 
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during the Election Day. The government created a favourable atmosphere 
for itself because it was able to ‘think’ and ‘see’ through the press. For this 
reason, the critical report of the OSCE mission was dismissed as being ‘the 
usual (response)’ and ‘blind to any violations other than those of the 
government’ because ‘these (the government violations) are needed for the 
‘customers’ who have paid big money in order to create a de-stabilising 
situation through the use of the ‘destructive elements’ included in the 
election observation reports.’ Election observers – particularly those of the 
OSCE mission – experienced a particularly difficult work situation. The 
plausibility and authority of their reports could be questioned because of 
(unofficial) accusations of ‘revolution plotting’. They had to work under 
conditions of ‘expectation’ from the opposition, and, on the other hand, 
under the internationally accepted principles of independence and 
impartiality.   
 
 
 Wearing Two Hats:  
Interpreting During Election 
Monitoring in Kyrgyzstan 
 
Elnura Osmonalieva 
Introduction 
 
This article highlights two challenges associated with election observation: 
the requirement of the impartiality of observers, and the role of the 
interpreter.  
These challenges are discussed in the context of the elections held in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2000 and 2005, with particular reference to the politically 
important electoral district of Karaunkur: this is where Kurmanbek Bakiev 
stood for election during the parliamentary elections in February and March 
2005.  
 
1. Background 
 
 The Growth and Consolidation of Opposition  
 
In February 2005, no.25 Karaunkur electoral district became one of the main 
battlegrounds of Kyrgyz politics. This set off numerous protests throughout 
Jalalabat Province in the days following the second round of parliamentary 
elections, and resulted in the ousting of former President Askar Akaev on 25 
March. Kurmanbek Bakiev, currently the newly inaugurated President of 
Kyrgyzstan, and at that time Akaev’s most feared opponent, was contesting 
for a parliamentary seat. This was not for the presidency, but it was still a 
potential way of continuing Bakiev’s popularity within the increasingly 
disenchanted Kyrgyz population.  
Bakiev had been Prime Minister under Akaev’s command from 2001 to 
2002. He left Akaev’s team after the infamous Aksy incident of April 2002, 
when police forces fired at a crowd of peaceful demonstrators, killing six 
and injuring dozens. After his resignation, Bakiev’s rating shot up and he 
started to be regarded as the opposition to President Akaev. In 2002, he won 
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a parliamentary seat, having competed in no.15 Ala-Buka electoral district 
(in Jalalabat Province), and grew increasingly vocal about his distrust and 
disappointment with Akaev’s government. In the year preceding the 2005 
parliamentary elections, Bakiev came increasingly to be viewed as the sole 
figure with the potential to unify the otherwise divided opposition.  
The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
found great resonance in Kyrgyzstan, stirring excitement within the groups 
that desired change. ‘If they did it, why can’t we do it?’ was the question 
heard at dinner conversations and on online forums. Increasingly, civil 
activists, particularly the foreign-educated youth, were coming to the 
conclusion that Kyrgyzstan needed its Saakashvili. However, they realised 
that there was nobody one could name as ‘the Kyrgyz Saakashvili’ at that 
point, nor was there a united group of opposition forces with a shared 
programme and popular support. All the same, they decided to make an 
attempt to unite. Besides the indiscrete and often overly demonstrative 
salutation of these two revolutions, the opposition was strengthening its 
efforts to join together. 
In the autumn of 2004, Bakiev was elected the Chair of the Central 
Council of the Union of Political Forces, the ‘Popular Front of Kyrgyzstan’, 
which included nine political parties. This was a loose union, possibly held 
together more by the need to gather material and human resources than by 
shared ideas and programmes. Neither the examples of the Georgian and 
Ukrainian revolutions, nor the increasing realisation that the next 
presidential elections were drawing closer and that Akaev would not give up 
easily, were sufficient to truly unite the opposition. This did not happen until 
a month before the parliamentary elections. Even then it was still more of a 
formal unification, stirred by the desire to show Akaev that the opposition 
was going to ‘play hard’, rather than a union formed on the basis of a shared 
platform. The real unification came shortly before the 24 March uprising. 
 
 The Government Reaction 
 
Months before the parliamentary elections in February 2005, the Akaev 
government started preparing for a backlash against the opposition forces, 
openly stating that ‘there would be no colour revolutions in Kyrgyzstan’. 
They had prepared the notorious ‘White House lists’ of all pro-governmental 
candidates that the CEC, its branches and all local officials, as well as 
everybody employed by the state (including teachers, nurses, and police), 
were expected – and in many cases ordered – to support. 
In fourteen years of rule, the Akaev administration had built up a wide-
ranging arsenal of techniques to manipulate electoral processes. The ultimate 
success of the election fraud that occurred under the Akaev government 
depended mainly on the three following factors: 
 
• the loyalty of the Central Election Commission (CEC), the 
administration at all levels, and of the head of CEC (appointed by 
President Akaev);  
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• the presence of poor, dependent, and thus vulnerable state 
employees (mostly teachers and medical workers), in election 
commissions; and  
• the loyalty of local state administration heads, most of who were 
appointed directly by the President or his proxies.  
This system worked perfectly in a corrupt state with a weak media and 
poorly developed mechanisms of civic control.  
 
 The Election Period 
 
On 27 February 2005, I went to no.25 Karaunkur district to witness the 
‘battle’ and to see just how far the government proxies were ready to go to in 
order to quash the opposition leader. Supplied with a CEC registration card 
which accredited me as an international observer from the European 
Network of Election Monitoring Organizations, (ENEMO), I started the day 
as an interpreter to one of the fifty-four ENEMO observers.  
 
 A Highly-Charged Atmosphere 
 
The then up-coming parliamentary election held much at stake for both 
parties. There were rumours of that Akaev and his aids were conspiring to 
get Bermet Akaeva into the parliament, turning Kyrgyzstan into a 
parliamentary republic and giving Bermet the seat of the prime minister. In 
fact, as if confirming that such rumours were not just hot air, Bermet Akaeva 
and her brother Aidar Akaev declared that they would run for parliament. 
This period, in which post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan is referred to as ‘the beginning 
of the end of Askar Akaev’, served only to fuel the people’s anger and 
certainly did little to stop their protests. Furthermore, it meant that they 
would not consider President Akaev’s appeal to keep order and stability, or 
his plea that they ignore those politicians who were calling the people to take 
part in civil disobedience in pursuit of their own interests (Kyrgyz State 
Television, 16 March 2005). 
Weak or strong, the Front later directed the mass uprising against the 
falsifications that had occurred during the parliamentary elections in 
February and March 2005 and that resulted in the ousting of President 
Akaev. But that was to happen later. In late 2004 and early 2005, the prelude 
had only just begun to squeeze the juices out of the White House inhabitants, 
with their allies repeating, ‘There will be no colour revolutions in 
Kyrgyzstan’ as their magic chant. 
 
 Government Tactics 
 
No.25 Karunkur district is considered to be one of the most difficult districts. 
Aside from being located in a high mountainous area with little 
infrastructure, it is home to very poor communities, consisting mainly of 
Kyrgyz but also a considerable number of Uzbek voters. The White House 
decided to take advantage of this and placed a candidate with an Uzbek-
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sounding name to compete against Bakiev. This candidate, Saidilla 
Nyshanov, a middle-scale entrepreneur, had no popularity to match 
Bakiev’s, but did have huge and incomparable support from the Akaev 
government. With power to abuse and willingness to bribe voters, and to 
intimidate state employees and workers, the Akaev government was ready to 
do whatever necessary to make Bakiev lose. 
 
 Bakiev’s Advantage 
 
The stakes were high, but Bakiev had the potential support of the 
southerners, who were feeling left out of the power sharing in a country 
dominated by northerners. Thus, Bakiev was liked not merely for being in 
outspoken opposition to Akaev, he also symbolised an opportunity to get a 
fair share of the power for the impoverished southerners. Bakiev’s southern 
origin would later win him numerous votes, with many voters saying that 
they were ‘voting for him because he is a southerner’. Notwithstanding the 
programme or platform, electoral preferences in Kyrgyzstan can often be 
based on the mere geographical origin of a candidate.  
 
 The Unwanted Third 
 
Besides Bakiev and Nyshanov, there was third contender. The owner of a 
medium-sized enterprise in his early thirties, Aibek Chomoev was ‘the 
unwanted third’; he was almost out of the game and out of view. Few people 
spoke of him and it seemed as though everybody knew he would lose. After 
all, he was even less known than Nyshanov, and people thought he was 
merely trying to gain popularity by running against the ‘bigger fish’.  
 
3. Election Monitoring 
 
 A Symbol of Hope 
 
Where can one appeal if the CEC, the law enforcement bodies and the higher 
court offices are all loyal to the president? If almost everything can be 
bought and sold, or faked, if nothing else worked? The few politicians who 
dared to challenge the system, and Akaev, were perceived as the brave and 
true representatives of the people – although many regarded them with 
scepticism, having lost their trust in politics in general. The indifference of 
the latter also helped corrupt officials to get away with their deeds. The few 
thousand citizens who were working in NGO and community groups could 
not garner enough mass support and material resources to present a serious 
challenge to Askar Akaev. Thus it is not surprising that civil activists and 
local observers looked up to international observers, and the institutions they 
represented, hoping that the international community could put pressure on 
the Akaev administration.  
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Election Monitoring 
 
The idea of election monitoring in Kyrgyzstan was introduced and widely 
promoted by such international organisations as the OSCE and the National 
Democratic Institute. All local election-monitoring initiatives were 
instigated, funded and supported by external international organisations. 
Thus, the language used by the observers was derived from manuals 
provided during pre-election training; these had been designed by 
international organisations and were based on the ideas of fairness, 
transparency and accountability. Prior to the presidential elections of July 
2005, elections in Kyrgyzstan had been conducted in violation of national 
legislation and had fallen far short of meeting international standards. After 
the presidential elections in 2000, the OSCE election observation mission 
concluded: ‘(they) failed to comply with the OSCE commitments for 
democratic elections’, and that, ‘the international standards for equal, free, 
fair, and accountable elections were not met’. The National Democratic 
Institute’s statement on the same elections confirmed this: ‘(the) election 
process failed to break a cycle of troubled elections in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Serious flaws during the pre-election period, and on Election Day, meant 
that the overall electoral process fell short of international standards for 
democratic elections.’  
 
 Election Monitors and Officials 
 Underlying Attitudes 
 
Known for orchestrating and covering up fraudulent electoral practices, most 
members of the national and local election commissions, as well as state 
officials, despised both the internal and external observers. The observers’ 
rhetoric reflected their perception of the officials as members of a corrupt 
political system who were working in favour of the acting government. 
Observers assumed that local officials, and members of the precinct election 
commissions, were supporting pro-governmental candidates and trying to 
fail opposition candidates. Opposition candidates and their representatives 
were seen as ‘the good guys’, i.e. pro-democracy, who were unfairly treated 
and thus deserved more attention than those representing ‘the bad guys’. 
 
 Interaction 
 
Verbal interaction between members of the Precinct Election Commissions 
(PECs) and observers usually followed the question–answer mode, with 
observers trying to obtain data about the precinct, the work of the 
commission, and voter turnout. The responses of the heads and members of 
PECs were usually respectful and positive, but not necessarily genuine, and 
were motivated by the desire to avoid getting into trouble with an 
international observer. Apart from a few cases, the international observers 
received VIP treatment. PEC members wished to be accommodating, and 
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made an effort to please and even win observers’ sympathy, in hopes of 
getting excused from violations and unprofessional conduct. In less-
important precincts, with only three hundred voters, PECs were under less 
pressure to falsify election results. Here PEC members did not put on this 
act, but treated international observers as if they were trivial. 
It appeared as though PEC members had been instructed to be very 
careful when dealing with international observers and avoid trouble 
wherever possible. It was important for the government to get good election 
monitoring statements, in order to support its lies about democracy having a 
strong hold in Kyrgyzstan. The government forces also needed these 
statements so that they would be able to parade them to anyone in 
Kyrgyzstan who might question the legitimacy of the country’s election 
practices. When an observer made a request, the PEC tried to fulfil it as soon 
as possible – unless it was a request to stop violating the law, in which case 
the PEC members would either pretend that they were doing something 
about it, or would shrug their shoulders and say, ‘these are the realities of 
our lives in Kyrgyzstan and we are just doing our jobs’.  
At a PEC in no.25 Karaunkur district, where we conducted the evaluation 
of the opening procedures in 27 February 2005, I spotted the presence of a 
local official (the head of the local forestry, as I found out later from one of 
the PEC members). He was well dressed, round-faced and had a big belly, a 
must-have among Kyrgyz officials. He was bossing the PEC members 
around, almost shouting orders in the minutes proceeding the opening hour. 
Arrogant, with an angry face, and talking on a satellite mobile phone, he was 
more than intimidating, and his equipment, in a village where even the most 
privileged do not have telephones, seemed like divine armour. When asked 
why he was on PEC grounds, he hid that magic armour and disappeared in 
the corridors of the school where the PEC was quartered. The international 
observer who was working with me said that this was evidence that the 
government had prepared its ‘troops’ well.  
 
 Corruption 
 
In the best Kyrgyz traditions of hospitality, most PEC heads and members 
offered tea and meals. ‘Shall we have some tea?’ or, ‘Have you eaten yet?’ 
they would ask, as if they had nothing else to do on Election Day but have 
tea with observers. ‘We are at work and should be working. Thank you’, was 
our polite and clear reply. The system of corruption in Kyrgyzstan is 
sustained through quiet talks and negotiations that take place during ‘tea’, 
which can expand into a sizeable feast consisting of a range of dishes and 
plenty of alcohol. The person who accepts ‘tea’ owes a favour to the one 
who ‘gave tea’ (or various favours, depending on the outcome of the ‘tea 
negotiations’). So, basically, ‘having tea’ means accepting a bribe – not 
necessarily in cash, but agreeing to bend the rules and provide favours – and 
this was what the PEC members wanted from the international observers.  
 A Final Point 
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It was not so difficult to note that the observers and PEC members interacted 
as representatives of two opposing camps, suspicious of each other’s 
conduct. Observers assumed us that the job of PEC members in this ‘battle’ 
was to support pro-governmental candidates, while PEC members assumed 
that the observers were there to control their work and support the opposition 
candidates (and their observers and proxies). Their presence was an 
annoyance on a very stressful day. It was often a hindrance; after all, it is 
hard to cheat, intimidate, bribe and falsify when there are people around who 
do not depend on you in any way, and who have the authority and possibility 
of telling the wider audience that you cheat – or even worse, telling your 
bosses in Bishkek that you did not manage to cover up the cheating. 
 
 Election Monitors and Opposition Candidates 
 A Biased Position 
 
Some PEC members and representatives of pro-governmental candidates 
complained that the representatives of the opposition were violating rules. 
Since it was widely assumed that the opposition candidates were ‘the good 
guys’, such complaints received little attention. In fact, they most often 
lacked evidence. It is not too difficult to understand why some international 
observers would often side tacitly with the opposition. Election monitoring 
missions primarily consist of people who work for, or are somehow 
connected with, international organisations or foreign governments that 
promote democracy. Still others are individuals not linked to any of the 
above, but who care a great deal about the democratisation of Kyrgyzstan 
and other developing countries. 
During pre-election training, international observers were briefed on how 
the government had harassed and violated the rights of the opposition 
candidates and their proxies. From the very start, the election setting was 
presented as being divided into two camps: there were the ‘bad guys’ who 
were seen as anti-democratic, and ‘the good guys’ who were vocal about 
their criticism of ‘the bad guys’ and who were harassed and threatened. They 
thus received the support of the international community, through the 
international organisations who sent election observers.  
Some of the ENEMO observers came from other former Soviet republics 
and were in opposition to their respective governments: given that 
background, it was natural for them to sympathise with the Kyrgyz 
opposition. For a foreigner, be it from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Europe or North America, with little or limited familiarity with 
the dynamics of Kyrgyzstan politics, the ‘us and them’ scheme seemed an 
easy one to follow. It put all new names, faces and alliances into convenient 
and understandable categories. 
Such a division did in fact exist, to a certain extent, as shown by the 
attitude of election commission members towards the international 
observers. Because of the global framework in which election observation 
missions operate and exist (to promote liberal values and democracy), and 
because the Kyrgyz opposition forces were seen to be fighting for the same 
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ideas, international observers automatically considered them as team-mates, 
colleagues, partners, and allies. 
 
 Election Monitors and Protestors 
 
After observing the second tour of the elections in February this year with 
two international observers, I returned to Osh and witnessed one of the first 
mass rallies in protest at the outcome of the elections. In the square in front 
of the Kara-Suu District Administration, hundreds of angry voters were 
demanding the resignation of the head of the local administration for failing 
to address their concerns about election results. 
The observers spoke to some of the organisers, having taken them aside. 
They wanted to give advice based on what they had seen during Kiev’s 
Maidan a few months earlier. ‘Do not give up. Do not disperse when night 
falls, or they will follow you to your homes and arrest you during the night. 
Bring food for the people, put up tents and yurts and demand that the 
election results are recognised as illegitimate.’ The response with a confident 
nod of the head was, ‘We are not going to give up. We are not going to leave 
the square.’  
It seemed as though the observers felt like their presence made a 
difference. One of them was returning satisfied with the work carried out 
during the day, and seeing a big rally and the brave voters added to the 
satisfaction. 
 
 Commentary 
 
I believe that observer impartiality is not breached by the fact that the 
observers side with the opposition, because that in itself does not provide 
grounds for observers to conceal or ignore violations done on the part of the 
opposition candidates. Even if this might happen, it will be on such a small 
scale as not to affect the overall result of the elections, and is certainly 
miniscule when compared to the scale of violations concealed by pro-
government observers and officials. Opposition forces and their supporters, 
including local NGOs and civic groups, treat international observers with 
great respect. The intimacy, bound by a commitment to democracy, has only 
served to strengthen the democratic initiatives in Kyrgyzstan. (Whether this 
commitment is genuine or not is, of course, another question.)  
 
Election Monitors: Local, External and Foreign Observer 
Interaction 
 
Most local, external and foreign observers treated each other as colleagues 
and team-mates. However, observers representing pro-governmental 
candidates were excluded from this, since they were seen as ‘the bad guys’. 
Generally, external and foreign observers were better informed of their 
rights, less dependent on the local authorities (who were running the show), 
and thus more bold and confident in their conduct. Many local observers 
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(aside from whether or not they represented pro-governmental, opposition or 
neutral candidates), appealed to them for help, advice and even protection. 
The most common form of mistreatment that local observers received 
from PEC members was restriction of movement within the voting area. 
They were often forced to observe whilst being told to sit down. Their 
complaints and protests were hushed by threats of removal for ‘disturbing 
the work of the PEC’. However, external and international observers asked 
local observers about the conduct of PECs and often received important 
information about violations or particular cases. Local observers were 
willing to act as witnesses as well.  
Local observers representing the Coalition of NGOs for the Democracy 
and Civil Society were perceived as the closest allies to the NDI observers 
(in 2000), and to the ENEMO observers (in 2005). This was because they 
represented the largest local monitoring network and were condemned by the 
government as being part of the opposition and ‘sell-outs for Western 
money’. The Association of Non-commercial and Non-governmental 
Organizations was another local NGO that monitored elections across the 
country. It was assumed within Kyrgyzstan’s NGO circles that it had been 
set up by the Akaev government in order to obstruct the work of the 
Coalition, and to produce reports that would boost the government’s image 
in and outside of the country. This was the way I described the Association 
to the ENEMO observer, so we treated its observers with some scepticism, 
although they seemed to be doing their job well enough. 
 
 Election Monitors: Conclusion 
 
The presence of international monitors did not stop PECs and local 
authorities from violating the law, though the international observers were 
able to pinpoint violations and get some of them corrected.  
Bakiev lost the parliamentary elections to Nyshanov, having received a 
little more than a third of the total number of votes cast. The result of the 
elections in no.25 Karaunkur district might have taken a different course if 
there had been no election monitors; Bakiev’s results might have looked 
even dimmer had the government officials been given more opportunities to 
run things their way. 
There were considerable problems with the lists of the voters. The 
villages in this constituency were not separated into streets with names, so 
all voters would have their residence registration at a given village. In 
villages with more than one PEC, people had a chance of voting more than 
once, by getting their name on additional voter lists. 
 
4. The Role of an Interpreter 
 
Interpreters: Advantages and Disadvantages  
 
Interpreters played an important role during the election observation, 
because the success of the observation depended on their knowledge of the 
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law and, to an equal extent, their acuteness. As a Kyrgyz, I was able to get a 
better feel of what was happening in a given precinct – whether PEC 
members were really doing their job or just putting on a show for the 
international observer.  
PEC members approached me more often than they approached an 
international observer. I spoke the same language and thus might have come 
across as somebody easier to approach, or as ‘one of them’, perhaps. For 
instance, tea and meals were usually offered through me. The members often 
tried to convince me to ignore some of the violations, appealing to my 
patriotism by calling me ozubuzdun kyzybyz (‘our daughter’). What they 
could not understand was that I wanted to make sure that the elections were 
fair and transparent, precisely because of my patriotism. 
Besides the obvious advantage of speaking the local languages (Russian, 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek), I had the advantage of familiarity with the local non-
verbal communication, and could therefore better understand the dynamics 
of the interaction between the PEC, voters and observers. For example, 
during the last parliamentary elections, I separated from the international 
observer in order to see what was happening in the local administration 
building, which was in close proximity to the PEC we were visiting. There, 
in a room crowded beyond capacity, I found an official who was issuing 
residence permits to voters. It seemed highly suspicious that this activity was 
taking place on the day of the elections. I observed the procedure for a few 
minutes before I was spotted and asked to leave the room. No explanations 
were provided. When I returned with the observer, the room was locked.  
In no.25 Karaunkur district, where Kyrgyz and Uzbeks live side by side, 
the politicians have the possibility of playing the ‘ethnic card’. In this area it 
was advantageous to be able to differentiate between different ethnicities. 
For some reason, Uzbeki voters seemed less informed about their electoral 
rights and thus more susceptive to intimidation. They also gave preference to 
an Uzbek candidate over a non-Uzbek. Just as Russians win in 
constituencies where Russians are a majority or a substantial proportion of 
the electorate, Uzbeks tend to win in Uzbeki constituencies. 
 
 Interpreters: Other Areas of Responsibility 
 Logistics and Finances 
 
Besides the interpreting and the monitoring itself, I was also responsible for 
the logistics and finances. Travelling in rural Kyrgyzstan can be difficult in 
wintertime, and yet this is usually when the parliamentary elections take 
place. If things go wrong, there is a possibility that the election monitoring 
might fail to be done properly. Important factors include having vehicles 
capable of driving on bad roads, and having food and drink available in 
places where there are no cafes and where shops sell only cold food. 
Ensuring that observers had access to a telephone was another task. Mobile 
phones worked in some places, but in areas that the mobile networks could 
not reach we were dependent on the government-allied Kyrgyz telecom 
providers. Though I never ran into a problem, this was an additional strain.  
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 Safety and Security 
 
Safety and security are also on an interpreter’s agenda. In a land where 
bandits rule, law-abiding observers and interpreters are not welcome. The 
threat of attack from pro-government forces was minimal, but it was still a 
concern. Back in 2000, during the first round of the parliamentary elections, 
I had to protect an observer with whom I was working from agitated voters. 
We had initiated a conversation with a group of voters, trying to find out 
whether there were instances of vote buying or campaigning on the day of 
the elections. This took place in a small, poor village in no.27 Bazarkorgon-
Suzak electoral district. As we were speaking, people grew angry at the 
observer: they felt embarrassed in front of a rich foreigner, for being poor 
and for having to be witnesses. They felt and acknowledged the fact that 
they had been subjected to the intimidation and violation of law, yet there 
was no way of admitting this without hurting their dignity and admitting 
their powerlessness. I did my best to explain that the observer was not to 
blame and it was up to us, the citizens of this country, to change things. In 
the end, I had to position myself physically between the observer and the 
crowd.  
 
 Interpreters: Status Issues 
 
In general, interpreters manage these multiple tasks well. Nevertheless, they 
have a subservient status to the observer (although unofficially) because they 
are there to assist the observer. For instance, at the last parliamentary 
elections, ENEMO did not require its interpreters to conduct their own 
assessment. Interpreters were not given assessment sheets; instead, they were 
there to help the observer in collecting data and to make possible the 
necessary observation. 
An interpreter does not have much power over an observer’s conclusion-
forming process, even though the observers are heavily dependent on the 
‘local’ knowledge of their interpreters. For instance, when working with 
ENEMO observers, my opinion carried less authority, even though I had just 
as much experience in election observation as the observers. But I was 
present only as an interpreter. For this reason, I provided my personal 
assessment to the ENEMO headquarters verbally (over the telephone) on the 
day of the elections.  
 
 Interpreters: Different Attitudes 
 
For many interpreters who work with election observers, it is a way of 
making sure that the elections go well whilst also supplementing their 
income. Most are students from Bishkek and the regional centres, and they 
care about their country having open, fair and transparent elections. 
The CEC registration card provides interpreters with the status of the 
international observer, so that they have the authority to demand access to all 
PEC and DEC sites, and so that they can observe all parts of the voting 
process (except the actual ticking of the ballot, of course). In this way, they 
have an opportunity to participate fully and to make a difference. However, 
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for some interpreters, election monitoring is just a job. For example, there 
were instances when interpreters fell asleep during the vote count, which 
usually took place late at night. 
 
 Interpreters: Suggested Areas of Improvement 
 
I have interpreted and monitored during two parliamentary elections and one 
presidential election. I have never let my role be limited to interpreting, 
though one observer tried to restrict it to that. I fully participated and worked 
in the same manner as the international observers, and in some cases even 
more so than they did. While international election monitoring organisations 
put more emphasis on preparing international observers than interpreters, it 
would be unfair to say that these organisations fail to understand the 
importance of interpreters during election observation. Interpreters are 
invited to attend pre-election preparation and they receive manuals (and 
copies of relevant legislation), although there is no comprehensive 
discussion about the importance and complexity of their jobs.  
Though the criteria used in the selection of interpreters do include a 
preference that they have an understanding of local political processes, some 
are hired only because they speak English.  
Interpreting during election monitoring is challenging and exciting work. 
It is multi-faceted and dynamic, and requires thorough preparation. Election 
monitoring organisations need to have a better understanding of interpreters’ 
role in election monitoring, and should improve their selection and 
preparation practices for interpreters. If interpreters and observers were 
regarded as equal, and the selection and preparation procedures in place for 
interpreters were improved, then election observation could be made more 
effective.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As with the elections of 2000, election monitors could not change the course 
and outcome of the elections. This is because election monitoring is just one 
of many methods that can ensure fair and transparent elections; Kyrgyzstan 
will have to change its electoral laws and pull its forces together in order to 
fight poverty. In the meantime, election monitoring will remain an important 
asset of democratisation, and the role of interpreters will continue to be of 
great importance.  
Now that Bakiev and his ‘mates’ are in power in Kyrgyzstan, and it has 
become clear that their commitment to democracy is of questionable validity 
and durability, interpreters will also need to explain to international 
observers that ‘opposition’ does not necessarily equal ‘democratic’.  
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